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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California Law, a regular feature of the 
Women's Law Forum,· summarizes recent California Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeal decisions of special importance to 
women. A brief analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised 
in each case is provided. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Child Stealing 
1. Parent with any right to custody not 
guilty of child stealing ............... . 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Community property interest in spouse's 
II' d' t b fit" recovery as lmme la e ene ...... . 
2. Distribution of postponed retirement 
benefits upon dissolution ............. . 
3. Community property personal injury 
damages and property purchased there-
with to be treated upon dissolution as 
separate property of injured spouse . ... 
4. Application of Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act to commu-
nity property division of military pen-
sion ................................ . 
5. Spousal support owed to previous spouse 
733 
736 
739 
740 
744 
is "debt chargeable" against community 
property of deceased husband's second 
marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 746 
B. CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
• The survey this year differs in format from that used in previous years. A more in 
depth analysis of each case rather than a summary is presented. For this reason, fewer 
cases are presented in the survey. In addition, recent California legislation has been 
omitted under the new format. The editors of Women's Law Forum would appreciate 
any comments from readers on this change. 
731 
1
King: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
732 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:731 
1. Schizophrenia not per se detrimental to 
children for custody purposes. . . . . . . . . . 749 
2. Expansion of right to temporary visita-
tion pending conclusive determination of 
paternity ............................ 752 
C. SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Refusal to order part-time working 
mother to pay child support upheld. . . . 754 
2. Award of family home as child support 
may not be conditioned on marital status 
or meretricious relationship ........... 757 
3. Husband's earnings are liable for sup-
port of his wife's children from previous 
marriage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760 
4. Spousal support issue to remain unde-
cided for reasonable period where hus-
band is unemployed through no fault of 
his own. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 762 
5. Support award of bankrupt spouse re-
duced by amount of discharged debt '" 764 
D. HEALTH AND WELFARE 
1. Medically necessary hysterectomy does 
not violate prohibition against steriliza-
tion of conservatees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 767 
E. PATERNITY ACTIONS 
1. Constitutionality of conclusive presump-
tion of paternity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 771 
F. MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Meretricious relationship is not "remar-
riage" justifying termination of spousal 
support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 775 
2. Administrative Code section limiting 
prisoners' conjugal visits to bona fide 
family relationships upheld. . . . . . . . . . . . 777 
III. PROPERTY LAW 
A. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
1. Landlord may not maintain separate 
financial standards for married and un-
married applicants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780 
2. Landlord's discrimination against homo-
sexuals violates Unruh Act . . . . . . . . . . . . 783 
B. RETALIATORY EVICTION 
Women's Law Forum 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/8
1983] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 733 
1. Eviction for reporting criminal acts of 
landlord is retaliatory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 785 
IV. TORT LAW 
A. CIVIL DAMAGES FOR RAPE 
1. Civil damages to husband and wife for 
rape of wife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 787 
B. MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Wrongful death suit for death of meretri-
cious spouse not allowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 791 
2. Meretricious spouse with "stable and sig-
nificant" relationship may sue for loss of 
consortium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 795 
C. WRONGFUL LIFE ACTIONS 
1. Child born impaired may not ·bring ac-
tion for wrongful life general damages 799 
I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. CHILD STEALING 
1. Parent with any right to custody not guilty of child 
stealing 
Cline v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 943, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. 787 (1st Dist. 1982). The court of appeal in Cline v. Supe-
rior Court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent 
prosecution of a father for child stealing and kidnapping where, 
having the only arguably valid custody order, he forcibly re-
moved his child from the child's mother.} However, it allowed 
prosecution of a child abuse charge against the father where 
there was reasonable cause to believe that the manner in which 
he removed his child placed the child in circumstances likely to 
produce great bodily harm or death. 
A mother moved from Indiana to California with her two-
year-old son. Although she neither had been served with nor 
knew of any custody order or proceedings, defendant father had 
obtained an ex parte order in Indiana granting him temporary 
custody of their son. Without trying to enforce the order legally, 
he arrived at the house where the mother and son were staying 
1. See also People v. Howard, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 189 Cal. Rptr. 120 (4th Dist. 
1983) (Child stealing conviction reversed where, although wife had valid custody order, 
couple had attempted a reconciliation). 
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and asked to see his son. When the mother brought their son to 
the door, the father grabbed him and ran, carrying him like a 
football and throwing him in the back seat of a car. When the 
mother caught up and struggled to prevent the car from leaving, 
the father pulled her into the car and the struggle continued, 
with the mother trying to grab the steering wheel and "jam" the 
transmission. 
The father was charged with three violations of the Penal 
Code: child stealing under section 278;2 kidnapping under sec-
tion 207;3 and child abuse under section 273a(1).4 The trial court 
denied his motion to dismiss and he appealed. 
Penal Code section 278 makes it a crime for a person with-
out a right to custody of a child to take, entice away, detain or 
conceal the child from his or her parent or a person with lawful 
custody. II But under Civil Code section 197,6 the mother and fa-
ther of an unmarried minor have equal right to the minor's cus-
tody, services, and earnings. Therefore, the California Supreme 
Court has held that in the absence of a custody order, a parent 
does not commit child stealing by taking exclusive possession of 
the child.' 
The court of appeal in Cline applied this reasoning to hold 
that where the father had the only arguably valid custody order; 
he did not commit "child stealing" by taking his son from the 
mother. Although the court found the father's actions to be rep-
rehensible, it would not "fill gaps left by the legislature,,8 and 
therefore issued the writ. 
To "kidnap" someone who is too young to give or withhold 
consent, one must do so for an illegal purpose or with an illegal 
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (Deering 1983). 
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (Deering 1983). 
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(l) (Deering 1983). 
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (Deering 1983). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (Deer-
ing 1983). 
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (Deering 1983). 
7. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66 (1959). 
8. The legislature had considered, but rejected, a bill which would have added Penal 
Code § 279, making it a crime in the absence of a custody order for a person having a 
right to custody to detain or conceal a child from another with a custody or visitation 
right. AB 2549, Cal. Leg., 1975-76 Reg. Sess. 
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intent.9 Because the father was at least equally as entitled to 
custody as the mother, the court found that his intent and pur-
pose were legal. 10 Therefore, they issued a writ as to the kidnap-
ping charge as well. 
Penal Code section 273a(1) makes it a felony, under circum-
stances likely to produce great bodily harm or death, to willfully 
cause unjustifiable physical or mental pain to a child or to "will-
fully cause or permit such child to be placed in such a situation 
that its person or health is endangered .... "11 Actual great 
bodily harm or death is not required.12 The court in People v. 
Peabody 13 held that proof of criminal negligence was required to 
find that a parent had abused a child under section 273a. 
The Cline court found that there was "some rational ground 
for assuming the possibility"14 that the father had, with the re-
quisite degree of negligence, endangered the person or health of 
his child. The court found that, although the mother's attempt 
to grab the steering wheel contributed to the danger, the father 
should have foreseen that her natural instinct would be to rescue 
her child. The court therefore refused to issue a writ as to the 
child abuse charge. 
The court in Cline held that until the legislature prohibits 
it, a parent with a right to the custody of a child may forcibly 
take such child from his or her other parent. This would seem to 
apply even where the parents' custody rights are co-equal. How-
ever, as some measure of protection for the child, the court 
would charge the taking parent with child abuse if the manner 
in which the child is taken endangers its person or health. 
9. People v. Oliver, 55 Cal. 2d 761, 768, 361 P.2d 593, 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 
(1961). 
10. See also Howard, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 1024, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (trial court 
erred in denying jury instructions on mistake of law and reconciliation where defendant 
father arguably believed attempted reconciliation had invalidated previous custody 
award). 
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (Deering 1983). 
12. People v. Jaramillo, 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 835, 159 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (1979). 
13. 46 Cal. App. 3d 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1975). 
14. Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 944, 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727 
(1979). 
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II. FAMILY LAW 
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Community property interest in spouse's recovery as 
"immediate benefit" 
Duggan v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 267, 179 Cal. 
Rptr. 410 (1st Dist. 1981); Hand v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. 
App. 3d 436, 184 Cal. Rptr. 588 (3d Dist. 1982). Two courts of 
appeal grappled with the question of whether or not a spouse 
not named as a party to an action by or against his or her spouse 
is a person for whose immediate benefit the action is brought, 
solely because of the non-party spouse's potential community 
property interest in the recovery. In Duggan v. Superior Court, 
the court held that a non-party spouse could refuse to be de-
posed under the privileges defined in Evidence Code sections 
970 and 971 in an action for dissolution and accounting of part-
nership, although she had a potential community property inter-
est in her husband's recovery. In Hand v. Superior Court, the 
court held that plaintiff husband's attorney could not refuse to 
produce plaintiff's wife for deposition under Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 2019(a)( 4) in a personal injury action in which any 
recovery would be community property. Although the proce-
dural contexts were slightly different, both courts used the same 
"immediate benefit" test and quoted the same cases in coming 
to these diametrically opposed· conclusions. 
In Duggan, an action for dissolution and accounting of part-
nership, defendant sought to depose plaintiff's wife and she as-
serted her privilege not to testify against plaintiff under Evi-
dence Code section 9701& and 971.16 The trial court issued an 
order to compel the deposition and plaintiff husband appealed. 
In Hand, a personal injury action, defendant notified plaintiff 
husband's attorney that he intended to depose plaintiff's wife. 
Plaintiff's attorney refused to produce the wife, claiming for her 
the same privilege.17 The trial court applied the spousal privilege 
15. CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (Deering 1966). 
16. CAL. EVID. CODE § 971 (Deering 1966). 
17. The court, however, chose to analyze the privilege under Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 2019(a)(4), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(a)(4) (Deering 1983), since the privileges in 
Evidence Code §§ 970 and 971 could not be asserted by plaintiff or his attorney for the 
wife. 
Women's Law Forum 
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and refused to issue an order compelling the deposition. Defen-
dant appealed. 
Evidence Code sections 970 and 971 grant spouses the privi-
leges not to testify against and not to be called as witness 
against their respective spouse. Section 973(b)I8 provides an ex-
ception to these privileges when the spouse asserting them is a 
person for whose immediate benefit the action is being prose-
cuted or defended. Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(a)(4)I9 
allows a person for whose immediate benefit an action is prose-
cuted or defended to be noticed for deposition by service on the 
attorney of the party so prosecuting or defending. 
In Freeman v. Jergins,20 plaintiff sought to recover money 
promised to him in an oral contract to find a buyer for defen-
dant's stock. The court held that a witness who had allegedly 
agreed with plaintiff to help him find the buyer for a share of 
plaintiff's profit, could not be examined under then Code of 
Civil Procedure section 205521 as one for whose immediate bene-
fit the action was being prosecuted.22 Despite his possible enti-
tlement to a share in any recovery, the court held that because 
his claim was against plaintiff rather than directly against defen-
dants, he was not such a person. 
In Waters v. Superior Court,2S the California Supreme 
Court held that "a person for whose immediate benefit an action 
. . . is prosecuted or defended . . ." under Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 2019(a)( 4) was a person who had an "immediate 
right to the amount recovered or some portion of it as soon as it 
was recovered by the nominal plaintiff."24 Although the person 
sought to be deposed was the sole shareholder of defendant cor-
poration, the court held that he was not such a person. In 
18. CAL. EVID. CODE § 973(b) (Deering 1966). 
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(a)(4) (Deering 1983). 
20. 125 Cal. App. 2d 536, 271 P.2d 210 (1954). 
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2055 (Deering 1973) repealed by Cobey-Song Evidence 
Act, ch. 299, § 126, 1965 Cal. Stat. 1297. For substance, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 776 (Deer-
ing 1983) (allowing a party to call and examine as if by cross-examination a witness who 
is identified with an adverse party). 
22. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 776(d)(1) (Deering 1983) (defining a person identified 
with an adverse party as one who will be immediately benefited by a recovery by such 
party). 
23. 58 Cal. 2d 885, 377 P.2d 265, 27 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962). 
24. Id. at 897, 377 P.2d at 271, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 159. 
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Southern California Edison CO. v, Superior Court,26 the court 
held that because of their rights to an "immediate share in the 
recovery," unnamed plaintiffs in a class action were persons for 
whose benefit the action was being prosecuted under section 
2019(a)(4).28 
The court in Hand noted that the test for an "immediately 
benefited person" is the same under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2019(a)(4) as it is under Evidence Code 973(b).27 Citing 
the above cases, it held that as long as the recovery is commu-
nity property,28 the wife's share in it is immediate enough to sat-
isfy the test. The court accordingly reversed the trial court's re-
fusal to compel the deposition. Citing the same language in the 
above cases, the Duggan court held that any potential commu-
nity property claim wife might have in husband's specific part-
nership property would be a claim against her husband rather 
than against defendants. Without a direct claim against defen-
dants, she could not be a person for whose benefit her husband 
was prosecuting the action, although she was one who might 
benefit from it.29 It reversed the trial court's order to compel. 
Since the two courts relied on the same cases, their differing 
analyses seem to be based on different views as to the nature of 
a community property interest. Certainly, Hand is inconsistent 
with Freeman to the extent that the case requires that wife have 
a claim against defendants. She is not simply an unnamed or 
absent party as were the unnamed plaintiffs in Southern Cali-
fornia Edison. The Hand court nevertheless views her commu-
nity property interest as one to which she has immediate access 
as soon as it is recovered, and finds that to be enough. The Dug-
gan court, on the other hand, views a wife's interest as arising 
from a legal relationship with her husband by which she must 
25. 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972). 
26. However, the court allowed a protective order under section 2019(b)(I). Id. at 
843, 500 P.2d at 628, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 716. 
27. Because there are no cases interpreting the phrase in section 973(b), the Duggan 
court also used the section 2019(a)(4) cases. 
28. The court found that under California law a personal injury recovery is commu-
nity property, although its value will be assigned to the injured spouse upon dissolution. 
29. Although the court also noted that under Corporations Code § 15025(2)(3) spe-
cific partnership property is not community property, it is clear that the court did not 
rely on this fact in reaching its conclusion that a potential community property interest 
is not a direct enough benefit. 
Women's Law Forum 
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claim her right to a share. The court reads the cases as strictly 
requiring a wife to have her own legal claim against defendants 
in order to satisfy the test. 
2. Distribution of postponed retirement benefits upon 
dissolution 
In re Marriage of Shattuck, 134 Cal. App. 3d 683, 184 Cal. 
Rptr. 698 (1st Dist. 1982) addressed the question of whether or 
not non-employee spouses can demand distribution of their 
share of employee spouses' retirement benefits upon dissolution, 
although such employee spouses have chosen to postpone retire-
ment. The appellate court followed the rule established in In re 
Marriage of Brown30 and In re Marriage of GillmoreS1 that a 
distribution of pension benefits can be demanded upon dissolu-
tion, but held that it could not be accomplished through 
monthly payments equal to what non-employee spouses' share of 
the benefits would be had employee spouses chosen to retire. Be-
cause employee spouses would not begin to receive benefits until 
they retire, such a distribution system would frustrate the equal 
division requirement of Civil Code section 4800. S2 
Husband and wife were employees of a company and benefi-
ciaries of its pension plan. At the time of trial for dissolution, 
husband's pension rights had vestedS3 and matured,s. while 
wife's had only vested. Both had decided to continue working 
beyond the time when they might retire and until retirement 
was required by the company. At trial, wife requested distribu-
tion of her share of husband's pension benefits on a monthly ba-
sis, as if he had retired and were receiving them. Instead, the 
trial court denied distribution and reserved jurisdiction to dis-
tribute the pension upon husband's retirement. Wife appealed. 
In In re Marriage of Brown, the California Supreme Court 
30. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). 
31. 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d I, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981). 
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (Deering 1983). 
33. Pension right is not subject to forfeiture if employment is terminated before 
retirement. Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635. 
34. Employee has achieved an unconditional right to immediate payment. Brown, 15 
Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635. According to this definition, the 
Shattuck court's use of the word "matured" to describe husband's pension was not com-
pletely accurate since he had not yet chosen to retire. He had, however, reached the age 
of permissive retirement. 
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first recognized non-vested and immature pension rights to be a 
"contingent interest in property" rather than merely an "expec-
tancy," so that such property rights might be distributed as 
community property upon dissolution. In In re Marriage of Gill-
more, the court found that an ex-husband whose retirement 
rights had both vested and matured, must, upon request by his 
ex-wife, pay to her her share of his retirement benefits, although 
he had chosen to delay his retirement. The court held that hus-
band could not, by exercising a choice completely within his con-
trol, defeat or control the timing of wife's receipt of her own 
property (her interest in the community pension). The husband 
retained the right to choose when to retire, but if that choice 
affected wife's property rights, he would be required to compen-
sate her. The court left the mode of such compensation to the 
discretion of the trial court. One mode suggested was payment 
of a share of the benefits on a monthly basis. 
The Shattuck court followed Gillmore by compelling imme-
diate distribution of wife's interest in husband's pension. But in 
addition, it held that the mode of distribution requested by wife 
would result in unequal distribution by requiring husband to 
make monthly payments from a "fictional" pension. It held that 
the present value of wife's interest must be actuarially deter-
mined, taking into consideration the uncertainties involved. The 
court left the mode of distribution to the discretion of the trial 
court. Presumedly, monthly payments would be acceptable, if 
they reflected the actuarial present value of the wife's interest. 3Ci 
If the purpose of the decision in Gillmore was to compen-
sate the non-employee spouse for lost property rights as a result 
of the employee spouse's choosing to delay retirement, Shattuck 
would seem to be somewhat inconsistent with that case. The 
Shattuck court, by valuing wife's interest in the pension with 
regard to the uncertainties inherent in the decision to delay re-
tirement, has shifted some of the risks of that decision back to 
the wife. 
3. Community property personal injury damages and 
35. Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 256 (1972) 
(disapproved on other grounds in Brown); Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 493 (1981). 
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property purchased therewith to be treated upon dissolution as 
separate property of injured spouse 
In re Marriage of Devlin, 138 Cal. App. 3d 804, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 1 (3d Dist. 1982); In re Marriage of Morris, 139 Cal. App. 
3d 823, 189 Cal. Rptr. 80 (4th Dist. 1983). Two recent cases in-
terpreted Civil Code section 4800(c)'s requirement that personal 
injury funds of one spouse acquired during the marriage, though 
community property, be assigned to the injured spouse upon dis-
solution. In In re Marriage of Devlin, the court of appeal held 
that upon dissolution, community property acquired with funds 
from a personal injury recovery of one spouse is to be treated 
the same as such funds would be if they had remained unspent. 
Although the married couple had bought a family home with the 
husband's personal injury funds, and had taken title in joint 
tenancy, the court held that section 4800(c) required that the 
home be assigned to the husband upon dissolution. In In re 
Marriage of Morris, the court of appeal held that an assignment 
of personal injury funds to the injured spouse need not be offset 
by an award of other community property to the uninjured 
spouse. In other words, section 4800(c) is an exception to the 
equal division requirement. 
In Devlin, all of husband's personal injury damages award 
were spent on a piece of property and specially equipped mobile 
home, which the couple took in joint tenancy. The couple had no 
other major community property. Upon dissolution, the trial 
court awarded all but some miscellaneous personal property to 
husband, and wife appealed. In Morris, the trial court awarded 
the part of the couple's community property consisting of wife's 
personal injuries settlement to wife in its entirety upon dissolu-
tion. The court divided the rest of the community property 
evenly between wife and husband, without offsetting the funds 
from wife's personal injury recovery. Husband appealed. 
Civil Code section 4800(a)S6 requires an equal division of all 
community property upon dissolution. Section 4800(C)37 reads in 
part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), com-
munity property personal injury damages shall be assigned to 
the party who suffered the injuries unless the court . . . deter-
36. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering 1983). 
37. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4800(c) (Deering 1983). 
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mines that the interests of justice require another disposition." 
The section goes on to define community property personal in-
jury damages as "all money or other property received or to be 
received . . . in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for . . . 
personal injuries or pursuant to [a] ... settlement ... of a 
claim for such damages . . . ." 
Section 4800(c) is ambiguous in two ways: (1) It makes no 
provision for property bought with "money received as personal 
injury damages"; and (2) it fails to address the division of re-
maining community property after personal injury damages are 
assigned. Therefore, it leaves open the question of whether or 
not such damages must be offset by awarding a larger portion of 
the other community property to the uninjured spouse. 
As to the first ambiguity, there is no case directly on point. 
Under Civil Code section 5110,38 a family residence acquired 
during marriage and taken in joint tenancy is presumed to be 
community property for purposes of division upon dissolution, 
even when such a residence is purchased with the separate funds 
of one spouse.39 Yet, in proposing the enactment of section 
4800(c)'s predecessor,4o the California Law Revision Commission 
commented that the section would apply even though money re-
covered for personal injury damages had been invested in securi-
ties or other property.41 In In re Marriage of Mason,42 the court 
denied a wife's claim to one-half of her husband's personal in-
jury damages, although they had been placed in a joint trust 
fund. 
The court in Devlin distinguished a gift of separate prop-
erty to the community, such as is presumed by section 5110, 
from a similar use of community property funds received in per-
sonal injury damages. Since such community funds are not sub-
ject to separate control, the court concluded that it was not logi-
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (Deering 1983). 
39. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. 
853, 856 (1980); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 
(1967). 
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 146(c) repealed by Act of September 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 3, 
1969 Cal. Stat. 3313. 
41. 8 Cal. Law Revision Comm. Rep. 1397 (1967). 
42. 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979). 
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cal to infer a "gift" to the community. It therefore followed the 
Law Revision Commission interpretation that the purchase of 
property with community property personal injury funds does 
not convert such funds to "regular" (section 4800(a» community 
property. Instead, section 4800(c) applies to such purchased 
property in the same manner as it would apply to the liquidated 
funds used to purchase it.43 
The predecessor to section 4800(c) was enacted at the same 
time as personal injury damages were converted from separate 
to community property. For this reason, one commentator has 
concluded as to the second ambiguity of section 4800(c), that the 
section was "designed to assure that personal injury damages are 
treated like separate property upon dissolution."44 In Mason, 
the court accepted the above interpretation without discussion 
and awarded $400,000 in community property personal injury 
damages to the injured husband without offset. Similarly, al-
though it did not discuss the ambiguity in section 4800(c), the 
Devlin court did not offset husband's award.411 
In Morris, the court concluded that the community prop-
erty remaining after assignment of personal injury damages was 
to be divided evenly for three reasons. First, the "notwithstand-
ing" language of section 4800(c) indicates it is an exception to 
the equal division requirement of section 4800(a). Second, the 
legislative history above indicates that personal injury damages 
should be treated as separate property upon dissolution, leaving 
the rest of the community property to be divided evenly. Third, 
because section 4800(b)(1)46 allows a court to award an asset to 
one spouse and offset it with an award to the other, section 
4800(c) would be rendered unnecessary by an interpretation 
which required courts to offset personal injury damages. As the 
court pointed out, such funds are often specifically earmarked 
for special equipment, artificial limbs, etc., for the benefit of the 
injured spouse. Therefore, the court concluded that section 
43. Thus, the only circumstance under which personal injury damages would con-
vert to regular community property is when it is commingled with other community 
property beyond recognition. 
44. 2 MARKEY, CAL. FAMILY LAW § 24.11 (2) at 24-17 (1978). 
45. It should be noted, however, that the couple in Devlin had virtually no other 
community property with which the court could offset the award. 
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(l) (Deering 1983). 
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4800(c) is an exception to the rule requiring equal division of all 
community property. 
The courts in Devlin and Morris have addressed the ambi-
guities in Civil Code section 4800(c)'s requirement that commu-
nity property personal injury damages be assigned to the injured 
spouse upon dissolution. Both courts resolved such ambiguities 
in favor of the injured spouse by holding that property pur-
chased with such funds must be assigned in the same manner as 
such funds themselves are, and that no offset of other commu-
nity property to the uninjured spouse is required. 
4. Application of Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act to community property division of military 
penswn 
In re Marriage of Biukema, 139 Cal. App. 3d 689, 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 856 (4th Dist. 1983). In In re Marriage of Biukema, the 
court of appeal upheld an equal division of a husband's military 
retirement pension under the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses' Protection Act. The Act overruled the United States 
Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty;n which held 
that community property division of military pensions was pro-
hibited under the federal military pension scheme which 
preempts state law. 
The final judgment of dissolution of the Biukema's marriage 
was enacted three months before the Supreme Court decided 
McCarty. The superior court had divided husband's military 
pension as community property. When McCarty was decided, 
husband appealed and requested a retroactive application of 
McCarty. 
California Civil Code section 4800(a)48 requires that all com-
munity property and quasi-community property be equally di-
vided upon dissolution. The California Supreme Court had held 
that military retirement benefits which had vested at the time of 
dissolution were community property under California law.49 
47. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering 1983). 
49. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974) 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). 
Women's Law Forum 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/8
1983] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 745 
However, in McCarty, the United States Supreme Court over-
ruled the California law by holding that California policy of di-
viding military pensions: (1) conflicted with the federal scheme 
of military retirement benefits; and (2) was injurious to the 
objectives of that federal scheme. Therefore, the Court held that 
the California community property law was preempted by the 
federal scheme. Since that decision, several California courts 
have denied retroactive application of McCarty where the trial 
court did not retain jurisdiction over the pension issue.llo 
Effective February 1, 1983, Congress passed the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act,1I1 which reads in part: 
(c)(1) Subject to the limitations of this section[u], 
a court may treat disposable retired or retainer 
pay payable to a member [of the Military] for pay 
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as 
property solely of the member or as property of 
the member and his spouse in accordance with 
the law of the jurisdiction of such court. 
The court in Buikema applied the above section to deny 
husband's claim for retroactive application of McCarty. The 
court correctly declared that "California law treating military re-
tirement pensions as community property is no longer 
preempted." 
Congress has finally clarified its intent as to the distribution 
of military retirement pensions upon dissolution. As the court 
held in Buikema, California community property law now stands 
without federal preemption, and military retirement· pensions 
will be divided as community property in California dissolution 
proceedings. 
50. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sheldon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 371, 177 Cal. Rptr. 380 
(4th Dist. 1981) modified, 125 Cal. App. 3d 415f (1981) (retroactive application denied); 
In re Marriage of Mahone, 123 Cal. App. 3d 17, 176 Cal. Rptr. 274 (2d Dist. 1981) (retro-
active application to dissolution stipulation denied). 
51. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
1048). 
52. Limitations include: termination upon death of member or former spouse, 10 
U.S.C. 1048(d)(4); maximum to one former spouse not to exceed 50 percent of total re-
tirement pay; 10 U.S.C. 1048(e)(I); maximum under all court orders and processes under 
this Act and the Social Security Act not to exceed 65 percent of total retirement pay, 10 
U.S.C. 1048(e)(4)(B). 
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5. Spousal support owed to previous spouse is "debt 
chargeable" against community property of deceased husband's 
second marriage 
In In re Marriage of D'Antoni, 125 Cal. App. 3d 747, 178 
Cal. Rptr. 285 (1st Dist. 1981), the court of appeal held that 
spousal support owed to a previous wife is a "debt chargeable" 
against the community property of her deceased ex-husband's 
second marriage.63 It reversed the trial court's holding that Pro-
bate Code section 205 excluded unpaid spousal support as such 
a debt. Thus, a deceased husband's second wife may be held 
personally liable for unpaid support payments. Her liability is 
limited, however, to the value of her own interest in the commu-
nity property immediately prior to his death and any of his in-
terest in community property that passes to her without 
administration. 
Plaintiff's first wife sued her ex-husband's second wife to re-
cover child and spousal support left unpaid by the deceased hus-
band. Reading section 205 to limit the types of debts for which a 
surviving spouse may be held liable, the trial court denied plain-
tiff a writ of execution on the unpaid support.64 Plaintiff 
appealed. 
Until 1975, the section which governed liability of a surviv-
ing spouse for the debts of his or her deceased spouse was for-
mer section 202 of the Probate Code.66 In 1975, section 205 re-
placed section 202.66 It reads in part, "the surviving spouse is 
personally liable for the debts of the deceased spouse chargeable 
against the community property . .. by the provisions of [Civil 
Code sections 5100-5138] .... "67 
53. Defendant had filed for and received determinations that certain property was 
community property and passed to her without administration. It is this property out of 
which plaintiff sought to recover her unpaid support through a writ of execution. 
54. The court limited the debts to those arising out of torts and contracts and for 
those owed general expenses. 
55. This section made community property liable for all the debts of a deceased 
husband. CAL. PROD. CODE § 202 (enacted 1931) (repealed 1975). 
56. 1974 Cal. Stat. 18 (Codified as amended at CAL. PROD. CODE § 205 (Deering 
1983». 
57. CAL. PROD. CODE § 205(a) (Deering 1983) (emphasis added). Section 205(a) also 
limits such liability to the amount the surviving spouse is entitled to from the commu-
nity property without administration. 
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Civil Code sections 5100 et seq. govern the respective prop-
erty interests of married people. Sections 5116, 5121 and 5122 
are particularly applicable to the reference in Probate Code sec-
tion 205 because they regulate the liabilities of community and 
separate properties for the individual debts of a spouse. These 
sections, which provide that certain individual debts are charge-
able to community property, do not include child support.1I8 
However, certain cases have clearly held community property 
partially liable for the husband's unpaid support obligations.1I9 
The decision in Weinberg v. Weinberg60 relies heavily on 
the husband's statutory control over community property funds 
in establishing both his right to make support payments out of 
such funds and the liability of such funds for unpaid support.61 
However, In re Marriage of Barnes and In re Marriage of 
Smaltz were decided after the enactment of Probate Code sec-
tion 205 and the amendment of Civil Code section 5125, and 
both uphold the rule that community property may be charged 
with spousal support.62 
The court of appeal in D'Antoni disagreed with the trial 
court's reading of Probate Code section 205. The court upheld 
58. Section 5116 makes community property liable for the contracts of either spouse 
entered into during marriage. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (Deering 1983). Section 5121 makes 
the separate property of either spouse liable for debts incurred by the other in acquiring 
"necessaries of life." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5121 (Deering 1983). Section 5122 regulates liabili- . 
ties for debts arising out of the torts of a spouse, satisfaction of which is allowed from 
both separate and community property. If the injury occurred while the injuring spouse 
was acting to benefit the community, the debt is satisfied first from community property 
and second from the separate property of the injuring spouse. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122(a)-
(b) (Deering 1983). 
59. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); In re Marriage of 
Barnes, 83 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1978); In re Marriage of Smaltz, 82 Cal. 
App. 3d 568, 147 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1978). 
60. Written before the enactment of Probate Code section 205. 
61. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d at 563, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Such statutory control no 
longer exists. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (Deering 1983) amended in 1973 to vest control in 
"either spouse" rather than in "the husband.") 
62. In Barnes, "[tjhe parties apparently agree[dj that [the husband's) court-or-
dered obligation to [his first wife) for spousal support is a 'debt' which is 'chargeable 
against the community property of his marriage to [his second wife) within the meaning 
of Probate Code section 205 .... " 83 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 714 (empha-
sis added). Smaltz (claim of living husband's second wife for reimbursement of commu-
nity funds spent by husband for spousal support) held that community property is liable 
for all of the husband's debts, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 570, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 155, and that 
reimbursement is not required when support payments are based on community funds 
alone. [d. at 572, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 156. 
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Weinberg, Barnes, and Smaltz against the apparently limiting 
reference in section 205(a). Its decision did not clearly address 
the issue of whether support payments are a "debt chargeable" 
at all. Instead, it ignored the reference to the Civil Code,63 relied 
on the above cases,64 interpreted section 205(c) to negate the ref-
erence in section 205(a),611 and made vague reference to legisla-
tive intent,88 public policy,87 and justice.8s 
The trial court in D'Antoni gave a reasonable meaning to 
Probate Code section 205(a) and to its reference to Civil Code 
sections 5100 et seq .. Nevertheless, the court of appeal followed 
questionable case law without adequately justifying its rejection 
of the trial court's interpretation. The court neither specifically 
addressed the reference upon which the trial court apparently 
based its decision nor cited cases that address such reference. 
Although D'Antoni left unclear the meaning of section 205(a)'s 
reference to the Civil Code, it did clearly hold that a deceased 
husband's second wife may continue to be held personally liable 
to his first wife for support payments he neglected to make. 
63. The court deleted the reference when quoting section 205(a). 
64. The cases are of little precedential value in interpreting section 205(a). Wein-
berg was written before the section was enacted. In Barnes, the parties agreed that 
spousal support was a "debt chargeable," so that particular issue was never reached by 
the court. See supra, note 62. Smaltz did not involve a fact situation similar to that in 
D'Antoni and its only holding was that when support payments were based only on com-
munity funds, and there was no separate property available to the husband, no reim-
bursement to the community was required. Smaltz involved no probate question, so sec-
tion 205 was not at issue. See supra, note 62. 
65. Probate code section 205(c) allows that "any debt described in subdivision (a) 
may be enforced against the surviving spouse in the same manner as it could have been 
enforced against the deceased spouse if the deceased spouse had not died." CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 205(c) (Deering 1983) (emphasis added). The court read this section to mean that 
support payments were chargeable against the defendant in the same way they would 
have been chargeable against her husband. A more reasonable reading of section 205(c) 
is that it would allow first wife to enforce against second wife those debts found to be 
chargeable, by writ of execution rather than by separate action. 
66. The court presumed that the legislature had not intended to change the long 
established rule that support payments are chargeable against community property. 
67. The court saw no public policy supporting the limitation of "debts chargeable" 
to those arising out of torts and contracts. 
68. The court's decision that it was in the "interests of justice" to reverse the trial 
court's interpretation of section 205 did not seem to be based on the relative financial 
status of the two women or on the husband's having no separate property from which to 
pay the debt. It is unclear whether considerations peculiar to this case motivated the 
court's decision, or whether the court would always find justice to be better served by 
charging a surviving spouse with his or her deceased spouse's unpaid spousal support. 
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Such liability will be limited, however, to the value of that por-
tion of the community property to which the second wife is enti-
tled without administration. 
B. CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
1. Schizophrenia not per se detrimental to children for 
custody purposes 
In re Jaime M., 134 Cal. App. 3d 530, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778 (3d 
Dist. 1982). The court of appeal in In re Jaime M. held that a 
mother's schizophrenia is not per se detrimental to her children 
for purposes of removing them from her custody under Civil 
Code section 4600(c). Although it upheld the trial court's finding 
that two children were within Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 300(a)'s definition of "dependent children," the court of 
appeal reversed the trial court's dispositional order removing 
them from their schizophrenic mother. It held that for such a 
disposition to stand, there must be clear and convincing evi-
dence that the mother's illness was in fact detrimental to the 
children and that termination of her parental rights was essen-
tial to avert harm to the children. It also instructed the trial 
court to include a reunification plan in its dispositional decision 
on remand. 
A mother of two children had a chronic schizophrenic illness 
which manifested itself in paranoid delusions which were, how-
ever, controlled by the use of drugs. She had been hospitalized 
three times for her illness, twice voluntarily. The children were 
healthy and she had not mistreated them physically. However, 
once, when she failed to maintain her drug therapy, she took her 
children to a police station and asked that they be placed in pro-
tective custody. 
Proceedings were commenced to determine whether the 
children should be removed from her custody. The trial court 
found that they were "dependent children" under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 300(a).69 It also found that an award of 
custody to the mother would be detrimental to the children, but 
failed to state on what evidence it relied in reaching its decision. 
The mother appealed, alleging that the evidence was insufficient 
69. CAL. WEU'. & INST. CODE § 300 (8) (Deering 1983). 
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to support the juvenile court's dependency finding and termina-
tion of custody, and that it failed to establish a reunification 
plan as required by California Rule of Court number 1376.70 
A dependency proceeding consists of two distinct hearings, 
one under Civil Code section 30071 to establish the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court, and another if jurisdiction is established, 
under section 356,72 to determine the disposition of the depen-
dent child's custody. For the court to assert jurisdiction and de-
clare a child to be a dependent of the court the child must be 
found by a preponderance of the evidence to be a person de-
scribed by section 300.78 On review, the appellate court must 
read all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court's 
findings and view the record in the light most favorable to its 
orders.74 
However, once dependency is found, the juvenile court is 
not required to remove the child from its parents, but has sev-
eral options.711 In fact, because of the strong policy favoring pa-
rental custody over non-parental custody, the California Su-
preme Court has held that Civil Code "section 460076 permits 
the juvenile court to award custody to a nonparent against the 
claim of a parent only upon a clear showing that such award is 
essential to avert harm to the child."77 Thus, subsequent cases 
have required clear and convincing evidence that particular det-
riment to the child would result from awarding parental custody 
before such custody fights are terminated.78 
70. Cal. R. Ct. 1376 (Deering 1980). 
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (Deering 1983). 
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 356 (Deering 1983). 
73. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (Deering 1979). 
74. In re Luwanna S., 31 Cal. App. 3d 112, 114, 107 Cal. Rptr. 62, 63 (1973). 
75. In re Jeannette S., 94 Cal. App. 3d 52,60-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262, 267-68 (1979). 
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (Deering 1983) (requiring. before custody is awarded to 
a non-parent without the parent's consent, a finding that parental custody award would 
be detrimental to child and award to non-parent is required to serve best interests of 
child). 
77. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 698-99, 523 P.2d 244, 257-58, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 457-
58 (1974). The court thus rejected the "best interests of the child" test when removal 
from parental custody is at stake. 
78. In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978); In re Jer-
emy C., 109 Cal. App. 3d 384, 167 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1980). 
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In In re Jeannette S.,'19 the clear and convincing standard 
was not met. Although detriment was shown, options short of 
terminating parental custody existed which might have mini-
mized such detriment. In In re A.J., the court held that a 
mother's adulterous relationship with her live in boyfriend was 
not "ipso facto depravity in the home"80 sufficient to justify ter-
mination of custody, but that parental custody under such cir-
cumstances must be weighed against all other possibly detrimen-
tal alternatives rather than against dominant social standards.81 
Under the above standards, the court in Jaime M. upheld 
the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction, but reversed and re-
manded for further dispositional proceedings. It found that the 
mother's actions in bringing her children to the police station 
and the fact of her mental illness were sufficient to establish, by 
a preponderance, that her children should be declared depen-
dents of the court. But the trial court's dispositional order was 
apparently based on its belief that the mother's clearly diag-
nosed schizophrenia was per se detrimental enough to her chil-
dren to justify their removal from her custody. The court of ap-
peal found no clear and convincing evidence of specific 
detriment suffered by the children and held that such detriment 
could not be inferred from their mother's mental illness.52 
It also reasoned that, as in Jeannette S., alternatives ex-
isted which might minimize such detriment,83 and that such al-
ternatives must also be weighed against the uncertainties of fos-
ter or institutional care and the parental home situation. By 
utilizing such alternatives, it would be "possible for the juvenile 
court to truly serve the best interests of the children by provid-
79. 94 Cal. App. 3d 52, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262 (where mother's home was filthy, dog and 
cat feces were found on floors, daughter slept on couch due to mess in bedroom and was 
sent to school in filthy clothes, removal from parental custody was inappropriate where 
household supervision was possible). 
80. 274 Cal. App. 2d 199, 78 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1969). 
81. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600(b) (Deering 1979) repealed by Act of Sept. 20, 
1976, ch. 1068, § 20, 1976 Cal. Stat. 4782 (recodified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) 
(Deering 1983). 
82. The court surveyed several medical and psychological essays to conclude that 
schizophrenia is a "catch·all" phrase for many types of mental illness with many varied 
manifestations and therefore a diagnosis of such was insufficient to support an inference 
of detriment. 
83. e.g., Parental custody conditioned on mother's continued participation in coun-
seling or supervised custody. 
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ing a stable, supervised home environment with their natural 
parent instead of penalizing all three for the mother's acknow-
ledgement of her problems. "84 
In addition, the court found that if on remand, the trial 
court did find that detriment to the children would result from 
parental custody, its order must include a plan for reunification 
as mandated by California Rule of Court number 1376(b). The 
reunification plan must be specific enough to furnish the mother 
with notice of the conditions she must meet before she is re-
united with her children. 
The court in Jaime M. made clear that even in cases where 
parents suffer from severe and chronic schizophrenia, their chil-
dren may not be removed from their custody absent a clear and 
convincing showing that such illness would cause actual detri-
ment to the children, and that such removal is essential in light 
of all alternatives, including in-home supervision and other con-
ditional forms of parental custody. 
2. Expansion of right to temporary visitation pending 
conclusive determination of paternity 
Gadbois v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 3d 653, 179 Cal. 
Rptr. (1st Dist. 1981) addressed the issue of temporary visitation 
rights of an alleged father of an illegitimate child prior to a con-
clusive determination of paternity. The case is unique because 
the holding significantly expands a father's right to temporary, 
or pendente lite, visitation subsequent to a preliminary determi-
nation by a preponderance of the evidence that he is in fact the 
father. 
The petitioner claimed to be the father of a two year old 
child and visited the child extensively for two years. When visi-
tation ceased, he brought suit to establish his paternity by intro-
ducing documentary evidence of a blood test proving his 
paternity.811 
84. Jaime M., 134 Cal. App. 3d at 544, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 786. 
85. Gadbois, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The bloodtest showed a 
99.3% chance that he was the father which is important where the father need only 
prove his paternity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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A subsequent motion for pendente lite visitation rights was 
denied. The trial court declined a preliminary determination of 
paternity and denied temporary visitation rights stating that no 
irreparable harm would be done if temporary visitation were 
postponed. The petitioner challenged the decision contending 
that absent a showing that visitation would harm the child, the 
court must grant temporary visitation rights. 
The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in failing 
to consider petitioner's evidence, in failing to make a prelimi-
nary determination of paternity, and in refusing to award tem-
porary visitation rights. The court relied on the Family Law 
Act,86 rather than the Uniform Parentage Act.87 The court noted 
that although the Uniform Parentage Act does not authorize 
temporary visitation rights, it does not bar those rights. The 
court then turned to section 4601 of the Family Law Act which 
states that "reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to a 
parent unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimen-
tal to the best interests of the child. "88 Because a preliminary 
determination of paternity had not been made, the trial court 
relied on the second half of section 4601 which further states 
that "[i]n the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights 
may be granted to any other person having an interest in the 
welfare of the child. "89 The court of appeal chose to follow the 
first part of the statute requiring visitation rights based on the 
following reasoning. 
Although section 4601 is part of the Family Law Act apply-
ing to custody, the court noted that based on its holding in In 
Re B.G.,sO "[v]isitation rights are a natural companion to cus-
tody rights,"SI and therefore section 4601 applies to this pater-
nity action. Once the court established that visitation rights ex-
ist in a paternity action under section 4601 and are not barred 
by the Uniform Parentage Act, the court then set the standard 
for determining when such rights are to be granted. The court 
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (Deering 1972). 
87. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7000-7021. (Deering 1983). This was the statute under which 
petitioner filed his paternity action. 
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (Deering 1972). 
89.ld. 
90. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). 
91. Gadbois, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 656, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 21. 
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found that the Civil Code provided no guidelines for such a de-
termination. Therefore, the opinion was based upon case law in-
volving the award of temporary child support pending a pater-
nity determination in cases brought against purported fathers.92 
The court correctly reasoned that if a purported father can 
be compelled to support a child pending proceedings to establish 
his obligations, he must also be afforded the same consideration 
for pendente lite visitation rights as would a proven father. 
Thus, the court held that the trial court must allow the peti-
tioner to present his evidence in a preliminary determination of 
paternity. Then, if by a preponderance of the evidence it is 
shown that he is the father, the court must allow him temporary 
visitation rights under section 4601, barring evidence that visita-
tion would harm the child. 
Gadbois v. Superior Court introduces a new standard for 
mandatory visitation rights of fathers of illegitimate children 
pending a paternity determination. Past cases have focused on 
the mother's rights to child support, while this case concentrates 
on the father's rights vis-a-vis his child. The decision is logical 
and well reasoned. The absence of case law on the subject ren-
ders this decision unique because of the rarity of paternity cases 
brought by the father. However, the issue of establishing pater-
nity and temporary child support is not rare. The obvious legal 
similarities are striking. In a legal system striving for equality, 
this case is a forerunner. This court has finally stated that a 
double standard will not be tolerated in the area of parent-child 
visitation rights. 
C. SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Refusal to order part-time working mother to pay child 
support upheld 
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 
92. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 87, 150 Cal. 
Rptr. 45 (1978); Carbond v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 768, 117 P.2d 872 (1941). These 
cases held that the alleged father must be given an opportunity to be heard and to pre-
sent his evidence showing that he is not the father. If he is proven to be the father by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the court would impose pendente lite child support. The 
proceeding is only for the determination of child support and is not res judicata on the 
issue of paternity at trial. 
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183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982). The California Supreme Court in In 
re Marriage of Flaherty refused to assume that the trial court 
had used a sex-biased interpretation of former Civil Code sec-
tion 196 in denying a custodial father's request for child support 
from his ex-wife. In so holding, the court did not reach the issue 
of whether such a sex-biased interpretation would be unconsti-
tutional. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by refusing to order a mother who worked only part time to pay 
child support, although she testified that she could have worked 
full time had she so desired. 
While a dissolution action was pending and after a tempo-
rary award of custody to a child's father and visitation rights to 
the mother, the mother requested a modification to allow joint 
custody. The court denied the joint custody request, but modi-
fied the visitation order to allow the child to visit the mother 
four months per year. The financial statements of both parties 
revealed that the mother's income was considerably lower than 
that of the father, but that she worked only part time. She testi-
fied: (1) that she would spend as much on her daughter in four 
months as her ex-husband would spend the rest of the year; and 
(2) that she could work full time if she wished and if it were 
necessary to support her daughter. 
Nevertheless, in its interlocutory decree, the trial court de-
nied the father's request for child support and ordered the par-
ties to share their daughter'S transportation costs. Neither party 
requested findings of fact from the trial court. The father ap-
pealed, alleging that the trial court applied a sex-biased inter-
pretation of former Civil Code section 196,93 and that the sec-
tion, as applied, was unconstitutional. The court of appeal 
upheld the trial court's decision and the father's petition for re-
hearing before the California Supreme Court was granted. 
Courts may base child and spousal support awards on earn-
ing capacity rather than on actual earnings.94 It is clear that 
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1971), repealed by Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1341, 
§ 2, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4744. 
94. Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 199 P.2d 934, 939 (1948); Meagher v. 
Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961). However, the rule seems 
to be appealed only in situations in which the supporting spouse avoids responsibilities 
by deliberately reducing earnings. See In re Marriage of Hurtienne, 126 Cal. App. 3d 374, 
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whether child support is awarded may no longer be based on the 
gender of the custodial parent, according to California Civil 
Code section 196.911 However, former section 196, which was in 
effect at the time of trial, was more ambiguous, reading in perti-
nent part: "The parent entitled to the custody of a child must 
give him support and education . . . . If the support . . . which 
the father of a legitimate child is able to give is inadequate, the 
mother must assist him to the extent of her ability."9s 
This section had been interpreted in two ways. Some courts 
had interpreted it to hold the father primarily and the mother 
secondarily liable for support, regardless of custody.97 Others 
had held that the custodial parent had primary liability for sup-
port in light of sections 435798 and 470099 of the Civil Code, em-
powering the courts to order either parent to pay spousal or 
child support.IOO The emphasis in this second line of cases is on 
a balancing of the needs of the children against the relative 
hardship to each parent in contributing to such needs. lol 
Although there was some lack of clarity regarding the hus-
band's argument in Flaherty, his main contention seemed to be 
378, 178 Cal. Rptr. 748, 749 (1982); Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121,96 Cal. 
Rptr. 408, 411-12 (1971). 
95. CAL. CIY. CODE § 196 (Deering 1983), enacted by Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1341, 
§ 2, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4744. 
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1971), repealed by Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1341, 
§ 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4744. 
97. Fox v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 194 Cal. 173,288 P. 38 (1924) (children denied 
"total dependency" presumption for purposes of receiving death benefits for mother's 
industrially caused death because mother was not primarily liable under § 196); Stargell 
v. Stargell, 263 Cal. App. 2d 504, 69 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1968) (illegitimate child found not to 
be on same footing as legitimate child for purposes of determining amount of support 
since father was primarily liable for legitimate child in mother's custody under § 196, 
whereas both parents were equally liable for illegitimate child under § 196(a)). 
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4357 (Deering 1983). 
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (Deering 1983). See also, former §§ 137.2, CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 137.2, repealed by Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 3, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313, and 139, 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 139, repealed by Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 3, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313. 
100. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1969) (fa-
ther's physical custody of children was factor subjecting him to primary liability for 
their support under § 196); Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 245 Cal. 
App. 2d 292, 53 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1966) (children of mother killed in industrial accident 
found to be "totally dependent" and entitled to Workers' Compensation death benefits 
because, although her duty was secondary as non-custodial parent, their need for her 
support imposed a legal obligation on her under § 196). 
101. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 245 Cal. App. 2d 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966). 
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that because it used a sex-biased interpretation of section 196 
(that reflected in the first line of cases above), the trial court 
failed to base its support decision on the wife's earning capacity 
rather than on her actual earnings as compared to his.l02 The 
Supreme Court, however, deferred to the trial court's discretion 
in awarding child support. 103 
Since neither party had requested findings of fact, the Su-
preme Court refused to find that the trial court had applied a 
sex-biased interpretation of section 196 or based its decision on 
the wife's actual earnings. Without such findings as to the num-
ber of hours the wife worked or the amount of money she could 
make working full time, the Court was obligated to presume that 
such facts would support the trial court's decision. 104 
Thus, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of 
whether a sex-biased interpretation of former section 196 would 
be unconstitutional. However, in a footnote, the Court indicated 
its opinion that such an interpretation would violate both state 
and federal constitutions. 1011 
2. Award of family home as child support may not be con-
ditioned on marital status or meretricious relationship 
In re Marriage of Escamilla, 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 179 Cal. 
Rptr. 842 (5th Dist. 1982). The court of appeal in In re Marriage 
of Escamilla held that an ex-wife's exclusive possession of the 
family home as part of a child support award may not be condi-
tioned on her remaining single or on the absence of an unrelated 
adult male in her household. Civil Code section 4800(b)(1) au-
thorizes conditional unequal divisions of community property 
assets under certain circumstances and such divisions have been 
upheld where they form part of a child support award. However, 
the court held that the above conditions were impermissible be-
102. But cf., Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411·12 
(1971) (earning capacity standard applied only when supporting spouse deliberately 
avoids responsibilities). 
103. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805 
(1976). 
104. Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 557, 468 P.2d 193, 86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 
(1970). 
105. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316·17 
(1977); Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 393, 563 P.2d 849, 138 
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) (strict scrutiny standard under California constitution). 
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cause they were unrelated to the ex-husband's economic inter-
ests in the house or to the children's need to remain in the fam-
ily home. 
In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court awarded exclu-
sive possession of the family home to the wife because the hus-
band was unable to pay child support. This award had the effect 
of deferring a completely equal division of the community prop-
erty until after the eventual sale of the home. The wife's exclu-
sive possession was to terminate upon the happening of any of 
several conditions, at which time the parties would be required 
to sell the home and divide the proceeds. Among such terminat-
ing conditions were the wife's remarrying or an unrelated adult 
male moving into the house. loe 
Civil Code section 4800(a) mandates an equal division of 
community property upon dissolution. l07 However, where eco-
nomic circumstances warrant, section 4800(b)(1) authorizes ex-
ceptions to the strict equal division requirement on conditions 
deemed "proper to effect a substantially equal division of the 
property. "108 
Relying in part on the legislative history of section 4800, the 
courts in In re Marriage of Bosemanl09 and In re Marriage of 
HerrmannllO held that section 4800(b)(1) allows an award of ex-
clusive possession of the home to the custodial parent where 
such home is the main or sole community asset, where there are 
minor children, and where the non-custodial parent is unable to 
pay child support.111 The court has broad discretion in con-
ditioning such awards so that they benefit the minor chil-
106. Unchallenged conditions included: (1) the youngest child reaching majority; (2) 
the destruction of the property; and (3) an agreement by the parties. Those challenged 
but upheld by the court included: (1) the wife's death; (2) the wife's and children's mov-
ing from the premises; and (3) the wife's failure to pay her part of the mortgage. 
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48oo(a) (Deering 1983). 
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48oo(b)(1) (Deering 1983). 
109. 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973). 
110. 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978). 
111. Such an award may be appropriate even when there is no such inability to pay, 
88 long 88 the wife's and children's interest in staying in the home outweigh the hus-
band's interest in an immediate equal division. See In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. 
App. 3d 152, 158, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (1980). 
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dren while protecting the non-custodial spouse's economic 
interests.1l2 
The Escamilla court, however, held that the trial court had 
abused its discretion by conditioning the wife's right to exclusive 
possession of the home on her remaining single and on the ab-
sence of an unrelated adult male in the household. 
Because the award was considered in part to be child sup-
port, the court reasoned that, according to Davis v. Davis113, it 
could not be based on the marital status of either parent. Al-
though, if the wife remarried, her community property interest 
(including perhaps her new husband's earnings) would be liable 
for supporting her children, the court reasoned that such liabil-
,ity would not, under Civil Code sections 5127.5114 and 5127.6,1111 
relieve the children's father of the duty to support them and as 
such would not justify the forced sale of the home. 
In addition, neither condition' was found by the court to 
have the kind of adverse impact on the husband's property in-
terests which would justify, under section 4800(b)(I), its inclu-
sion as a condition. His emotional interest in keeping another 
adult male from the home was not found to be sufficient when 
weighed against the children's interest in staying in the home 
under those conditions. 
In summary, although a court may grant conditional exclu-
sive possession of the family home to the custodial parent, it 
may not condition such right to possession on factors such as the 
custodial parent's marital status or the absence from the home 
of an unrelated adult male, which have no bearing on the eco-
nomic interests of the non-custodial parent. In other words, it 
must impose only conditions which are "proper to effect a sub-
stantially equal division of the property." 
112. Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 375-76,107 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35; Herrman, 84 Cal. 
App. 3d at 365, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53. 
113. 68 Cal. 2d 290, 291, 437 P.2d 502, 503, 66 Cal. Rptr. 14, 15 (1968). 
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972). 
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (Deering 1983). 
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3. Husband's earnings are liable for support of his wife's 
children from previous marriage 
In re Marriage of Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 178 Cal. 
Rptr. 477 (1st Dist. 1981), the court of appeal held that upon a 
Motion for Modification of Child Support under Civil Code sec-
tions 196, 242, 687, 5105, 5125, and 5127.5 a court must examine 
the wife's community property interest from her present mar-
riage, including her present husband's income, to determine if 
there has been a change of circumstances in her financial status. 
Prior to the enactment of section 5127.5, a court could not re-
quire that the present husband's earnings be used for support of 
his wife's child from a previous marriage. 
In re Marriage of Havens is a partially erroneous interpre-
tation of the law based solely on the court's review of section 
5127.5. The court failed to include a review of section 5127.6 
which only requires such an assessment of the present husband's 
earnings regarding the support of a child who is living with him, 
not of a child living with his natural father. 
The facts of the case indicate that Sandra Havens was 
awarded custody of her two boys, David and Daniel. A year or 
two later (the record is unclear), David went to live with his fa-
ther. At that time, Ronald Havens was the child's sole supporter 
as Sandra's monthly income was considerably less than Ron-
ald's. Both parties remarried and their combined community 
property income was substantially the same. Ronald filed a mo-
tion with the superior court to modify child support alleging 
change of circumstances. He also requested that the court issue 
written findings of fact on the matter. Both the motion and the 
request were denied and Ronald appealed contending that Sim-
dra should bear a portion of the parental duty to support David 
and Daniel. He also contended that the court erroneously denied 
his request for written findings of fact. liS 
Prior to the enactment of section 5127.5, a husband was not 
bound to use his income to maintain his wife's children by a for-
116. On the second contention, the court explained that Civil Code section 4700, 
enacted after the superior court proceedings, explicitly provides for written findings of 
fact where support of a minor child is at issue whether it be on a motion or a judgment. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (Deering 1983). 
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mer husband. ll7 Such support was only required if in loco 
parentis was established-if the husband took voluntary steps 
to offer emotional or economic support to the child. Section 
5127.5, which was relied upon by the court, succeeded the previ-
ous statutes stating that, "[t]he wife's interest in the community 
property, including the earnings of her husband, is liable for the 
support of her children to whom the duty to support is owed 
"118 
In its opinion, the court stated that "Ronald and Sandra 
had an equal duty to support David and Daniel. And each of 
them had an equal right to use the community income of his, or 
her, subsequent marriage for that purpose."111 The court's rea-
soning was based in numerous statutes stating that the father 
and mother have an equal responsibility to support their chil-
o dren.12o The court also concluded that there is a duty to sup-
port,121 that community property is property acquired by hus-
band or wife during marriage,122 that the community property 
interest is an equal one,123 that each spouse, acting in good faith, 
has the management and control of the community property, 124 
and as stated above, that the wife's interest in the community 
property, including the earnings of her husband, is liable for 
child support. m The court stated that the trial court did not 
appropriately apply these statutes and therefore remanded the 
case for further consideration. 
The court of appeal failed to mention section 5127.6 which 
also states that such community property interest (husband's in-
come) "shall be considered unconditionally available for the care 
and support of any child who resides with the child's natural or 
adoptive parent who is married to such spouse."126 In light of 
such an oversight, the court's instructions are unclear. It seems 
to imply that Sandra's community property interest should be 
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120 (Deering 1983). 
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972). 
119. In re Marriage of Havens 125 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 479. 
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1983). 
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 242 (Deering 1983). 
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (Deering 1971). 
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (Deering 1983). 
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (Deering 1983). 
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972). 
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (Deering 1983) (Emphasis Added). 
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assessed in determining her cluty to support both Daniel, who 
lives with her, and David, who lives with his natural father. Such 
an implication is an erroneous interpretation of the law. 
The court succeeds in establishing case law supporting the 
legislature's enactment of sections 5127.5 and 5127.6 clarifying 
that the community property interests of the wife in a subse-
quent marriage are to be evaluated in determining child support. 
This case must be read with caution before concluding that the 
holding also applies to economic support of a child not living 
with his/her mother and her subsequent husband. On this point, 
the statute is clear and the case is not. Both require the use of 
community interests from subsequent marriages for child sup-
port. While the court is unclear in its decision, the statute ex-
pressly states that such income can only be required to support 
a child living with that subsequent spouse. 
.. 
In re Marriage of Havens conclusively upholds section 
5127.5 requiring a husband to use his income to support his 
wife's child by a former marriage if the child's home is with his 
mother. The failure of the court to mention section 5127.6 leaves 
open the question of community property support of a child not 
living with his/her mother and her present husband. Had the 
court addressed section 5127.6 then it would be clear that the 
court interpreted the statutory language as including support of 
a child living with the other parent. The absence of the section 
could be an indication of its unimportance or it could be con-
strued as an oversight, to be addressed more thoughtfully in a 
subsequent case. 
4. Spousal support issue to remain undecided for reason-
able period where husband is unemployed through no fault of 
his own 
In re Marriage of Hurtienne, 126 Cal. App. 3d 374, 178 Cal. 
Rptr. 748 (2d Dist. 1981). The court in In re Marriage of Hur-
tie nne held that when a divorcing husband is not deliberately or 
intentionally unemployed, the proper standard for awarding 
spousal support should generally be his actual earnings rather 
than his earning potential. When the husband has become un-
employed through no fault of his own, the spousal support issue 
should remain undecided for a reasonable time period (here 90 
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days). During that time, the husband has an opportunity to 
prove good faith by seeking employment. Hurtienne implied 
that if during the 90 day period the husband deliberately 
avoided employment, the court could apply an "earning poten-
tial" standard in awarding support. 
Shortly before the trial for dissolution of marriage, husband 
was discharged from his long term employment due to a reduc-
tion in personnel. The trial court used his earning potential, as 
evidenced by his previous employment, in awarding support to 
wife. However, because he was unemployed at the time, the trial 
court delayed his first spousal support payment for 30 days. The 
appellate court reversed the spousal support decision on two 
grounds. It held, first, that the "earning potential" standard was 
inappropriate in such a case, and second, that 30 days was not a 
. reasonable period in which to expect husband to find a job com-
parable to his past employment. 
Two standards have been used in California in awarding 
spousal support. The "earning potential" standard has been ad-
vocated because, "[i]f the court were limited to the momentary 
current earnings of a husband, . . . the court would get a dis-
torted view of his financial potential. "127 The standard seems to 
have been used, however, only where the husband has deliber-
ately or intentionally caused a reduction in his actual earnings 
or avoided employment. For instance, in one case the husband 
deliberately quit his job at the time he sought a divorce. us The 
second standard bases support payments on the husband's ac-
tual earnings. Courts seem to apply this standard when the hus-
band's earnings are low or non-existent through no fault of his 
own.11l9 The court in Hurtienne applied this standard. 
The appellate court recognized that the trial court had al-
lowed the husband 30 days in which to seek employment com-
mensurate with his earning potential, but held that such a pe-
. 
127. Meagher v. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961). 
128. [d. at 63, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 651. See also, In re Marriage of Rome, 109 Cal. App. 
3d 961, 167 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1980). 
129. Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1971) (re-
duction in support based on reduction in husband's actual earnings upheld based on 
evidence that husband had not deliberately depressed his income). See also, In re Mar-
riage of Reese, 73 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125, 140 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1977) (above analysis 
applied to initial support award). 
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riod was too short to justify use of the "earning potential" 
standard. The appellate court's approach was to continue to 
award spousal support for 90 days to allow the husband to seek 
work. The court found it unreasonable for support payments to 
begin automatically at a previously established amount based on 
the husband's earning potential. Instead, a 90 day continuance 
would allow the court to decide which standard to apply, based 
on whether the husband sought employment in good faith or 
avoided doing SO.130 
The continuance approach as used in Hurtienne carries the 
potential for abuse. If 90 days is routinely used as the "reasona-
ble period" it may be abused by spouses who might be expected 
to find employment in less time. However, Hurtienne actually 
held only that the continuance should be for a reasonable time 
and that in this case 90 days was reasonable. Abuse can be 
avoided if courts determine the time period on a case by case 
basis. Courts should weigh the husband's type of employment 
and potential difficulty in finding work against the fact that the 
wife will not only be without support for a time, but will also be 
without the ability to rely on a specific future award in budget-
ing for her family's needs. 
The court in Hurtienne adopted the view that an "earning 
potential" standard should not be used in awarding spousal and 
child support unless there is bad faith on the part of the hus-
band in depressing his earnings. The court also applied a new 
approach in determining whether such bad faith exists. This ap-
proach, allows the husband a reasonable time in which to show a 
good faith effort to meet his responsibilities. However, it does 
leave unresolved for a time the important issue of spousal and 
child support, to the possible detriment of the dependent wife 
and children. 
130. This approach was first used in In re Marriage of Rome, 109 Cal. App. 3d 961, 
167 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1980) to protect wife from potentially permanent reduction in sup-
port based on ex-husband's actual earnings. Court gave wife 90 days in which to prove 
that ex-husband was deliberately avoiding responsibilities and that therefore earning po-
tential standard was appropriate. Hurtienne is the first case to use this approach to 
protect husband's interests. 
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5. Support award of bankrupt spouse reduced by amount 
of discharge debt 
In re Marriage of Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal. 
Rptr. 756 (1st Dist. 1982). In In re Marriage of Clements, the 
court of appeal held that an ex-wife's support award could be 
reduced when her ex-husband assumed obligation for a commu-
nity debt which had been awarded to her as part of a property 
settlement. Although she had discharged such debt in bank-
ruptcy, and reduction of her support award admittedly frus-
trated such discharge, the court held that California law is not 
preempted by federal bankruptcy laws in the area of spousal 
support. 
Husband, a dentist, and wife, a homemaker, had been mar-
ried approximately 20 years. Upon dissolution of their marriage, 
community debts and assets were divided equally and wife was 
awarded spousal support and ordered to hold her husband 
harmless from liability for the debts awarded to her. Wife was 
unable to generate enough income to pay her debts and was 
eventually adjudged bankrupt. The creditors then turned to 
husband, who began making payments and requested a modifi-
cation in the support he was paying to wife. The family law 
court granted a modification offsetting his monthly payments to 
the creditors and wife appealed. 
The policy supporting discharging debts through bank-
ruptcy is to provide a debtor with, "a new opportunity in life 
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of pre existing debt."13l California clearly 
provides for a modification of support based on a change in eco-
nomic circumstances,132 including a newly incurred indebtedness 
or expense.133 In addition, Civil Code section 4812 as amended in 
1977134 authorizes a court to treat the discharge in bankruptcy of 
an obligation from a property settlement as a change in circum-
stances and to modify support accordingly. The circumstances 
considered in setting_ or modifying an award include the needs of 
131. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
132. Dean v. Dean, 59 Cal. 2d 655, 381 P.2d 944, 31 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1963); Engelberg 
v. Engelberg, 257 Cal. App. 2d 821, 824-25, 65 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (1968). 
133. Dean, 59 Cal. 2d 655, 381 P.2d 944, 31 Cal. Rptr. 64. 
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4812 (Deering 1983). 
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the parties, their abilities to meet their needs, the property they 
own, their obligations and their actual and potential earnings.131! 
The court in Clements considered the tension between the 
federal bankruptcy policy, which would support wife's right to 
be free from any liability for discharged debts, and the state 
court's interest in the equal division of community debts and 
assets. It cited two cases which had dealt with this tension. 
In In Re Paderewski v. Barrett,t3s community debts were 
ordered to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the commu-
nity residence before such proceeds were equally divided. Wife 
was adjudged bankrupt and, upon sale of the house, her trustee 
in bankruptcy was awarded half the proceeds before payment of 
the community debts. Husband appealed and the circuit court 
reversed, holding that the bankrupt's, and therefore the trustee's 
interests in the property were limited by the divorce decree. 
In In re Marriage of Cohen,137 the husband was adjudged 
bankrupt between his separation from his wife and dissolution. 
In his bankruptcy petition, he listed several community debts, 
which were discharged as to him. The court refused to reassign 
to him his share of the community debts so discharged, holding 
that "any provision ... requiring payment by husband of these 
discharged obligations, whether to wife or others, would be con-
trary to the federal supremacy clause ... of the United States 
Constitution. "138 
The Clements court recognized that the Cohen fact situa-
tion was more compelling than that in Paderewski. 189 In fact, it 
noted that requiring direct payment of the debts by wife out of 
the sale of community propertyl40 would probably "have suf-
fered from the same infirmity as the proposed order in . . . 
Cohen."141 
135. Mall v. Mall, 42 Cal. 2d 435, 442, 267 P.2d 249, 253 (1954). 
136. 564 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). 
137. 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980). 
138. [d. at 843, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (emphasis added). 
139. Since there was no provision for payment of community debts out of the sale of 
property or any specific fund set aside for such payment, Clements was distinguishable 
from Paderewski. 
140. The trial court had initially ordered such payment. 
141. Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 744·45, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 760. 
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The court distinguished Cohen, however, because the focus 
in that case was on payments to discharged creditors, whereas in 
Clements it was on spousal support. It held that since the area 
of domestic relations has been left exclusively to the states,142 
the federal bankruptcy policy does not preclude modification of 
a support award to reflect discharged debts. Therefore, the court 
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by modify-
ing the support award,143 although wife's inability to meet her 
needs seemed clear in light of her bankruptcy, and husband was 
a dentist with a steady income. 
In effect, the result was the same as it would have been had 
the court continued support payments at the previous rate and 
ordered the wife to pay the debts directly. It is difficult to see 
how a change in "focus" with the same effect is sufficient to dis-
tinguish Clements from Cohen, wherein it was held that federal 
bankruptcy policy precluded the court from requiring payment 
of discharged debts, to the ex-spouse or others. In this respect, 
it appears that Clements is inconsistent with Cohen, despite the 
court's change in "focus." 
D. HEALTH AND WELFARE 
1. Medically necessary hysterectomy does not violate pro-
hibition against sterilization of conservatees 
Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. 516 (3d Dist. 1982). In Maxon v. Superior Court, the court 
of appeal held that section 2356(d) of the Probate Code, prohib-
iting the court from authorizing the sterilization of a con-
servatee, does not apply to a medically necessary hysterectomy 
which incidentally renders the conservatee sterile. Using a "clear 
and convincing" standard of medical necessity, the court author-
ized the conservator of a mentally disturbed woman to consent 
to a hysterectomy where it was shown that there was an 80 per-
cent chance the conservatee would develop invasive cervical can-
cer and where alternative treatments were contraindicated be-
cause of her mental illness. 
142. Ohio Ex rei. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930). 
143. The standard used on review was whether any reasonable judge could have 
made such an order. In re Marriage of Melton, 107 Cal. App. 3d 559, 564, 165 Cal. Rptr. 
753, 757 (1980). 
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Alexandra, a mentally unstable woman, was diagnosed as 
having a pre-cancerous condition of the cervix, with an 80 per-
cent chance that it would develop into invasive cervical cancer. 
According to doctors, such cancer would lead to a prolonged con-
dition that could be treated only by radiation therapy. Three 
choices of treatment were generally recommended for the pre-
cancerous condition. The first two required a high degree of co-
operation from a patient over a prolonged follow-up period. The 
third was a total abdominal hysterectomy which would render 
the patient sterile. 
Because of Alexandra's mental condition and uncooperative 
nature as a patient, three doctors recommended a hysterectomy 
as the only possible successful pre-cancer treatment. According 
to these doctors, the cure rate by hysterectomy in such cases was 
very nearly 100 percent. Alexandra would not and/or could not 
consent to the hysterectomy, and her conservator petitioned the 
court under Probate Code section 2357144 for authorization to 
consent for her. 
Section 2357 $ets out the procedure for a conservator to re-
quest authorization to consent to non-emergency medical treat-
ment which was not previously authorized and for which the 
conservatee is unable to give an informed consent. Section 
2357(h)1411 requires the court to make three findings before au-
thorizing such treatment: (1) the recommended treatment is 
medically required; (2) if untreated, the condition will probably 
become life-endangering or seriously threaten the conservatee's 
health; and (3) the conservatee is unable to give an informed 
consent to the treatment. However, Probate Code section 
2356(d)146 provides that, "no ... conservatee may be sterilized 
under the provisions of this division." 
Buck u. Bell,147 a United States Supreme Court case decided 
in 1927, reflects the then pervasive attitude regarding the pro-
creative rights of mentally ill and retarded people. The Court 
struck down a substantive due process attack under the four-
144. CAL. PROD. CODE § 2357 (Deering 1981). 
145. CAL. PROD. CODE § 2357(h) (Deering 1981). 
146. CAL. PROD. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 1981). 
147. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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teenth amendment against a Virginia statute authorizing the 
sterilization of hereditary "mental defectives," saying essentially 
that three generations of mental defectives was enough. Since 
that time, as procreation has come to be seen as a fundamental 
right,148 courts' attitudes toward the sterilization of conservatees 
has changed,149 although Buck v. Bell has not been explicitly 
overturned. 
Because of the fundamental nature of the right involved, 
the California courts have refused to order sterilization absent 
specific legislative authorization. In Guardianship of Kemp/ISO a . 
conservator appeared before a probate court to request an order 
for sterilization of his conservatee. The appellate court reversed 
the resulting probate court order, finding that the probate 
court's limited jurisdiction did not include the right to order 
sterilization. But in Guardianship of Tulley/lSI the court made 
clear that not even a court with general equity jurisdiction could 
violate the fundamental right of procreation by ordering sterili-
zation, absent specific statutory authorization. This was true 
even though sterilization was in the best medical and social in-
terests of the conservatee. 
Even in light of the above historical movement toward rec-
ognizing procreation as a fundamental right despite medical and 
social needs, the court in Maxon authorized Alexandra's hyster-
ectomy. Certainly, it was presented with a stronger medical case 
that were the courts in Kemp and Tulley, but even so the 
court's reasoning is troublesome. 
Tulley specifically held that without statutory authoriza-
tion, sterilization could not be ordered. While recognizing the 
fundamental nature of the right involved and the Tulley re-
quirement of statutory authorization, the court here seems to 
find such authorization in section 2356(d) simply because it is 
148. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Cf, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972). 
149. See e.g., Matter of A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981). 
150. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974). 
151. 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978) (guardian'S petition for steriliza-
tion order denied although 20 year old ward had mentality of 3 year old, was unable to 
understand or care for sanitary needs in connection with her menstrual cycle, and preg-
nancy would cause her psychiatric harm). 
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said to be "consistent with [Kemp and Tulley]."IG2 From this, 
the court concludes that that section is "inapplicable in cases in 
which the purpose of the proposed surgery is to protect the life 
of the incompetent rather than to prevent her from bearing chil-
dren," and warns in a footnote that its decision should be read 
to apply only where the condition will probably become life-en-
dangering. However, section 2346(d) alone does not authorize 
courts to order medically necessary sterilization, as Tulley re-
quired. It is difficult to understand how the court could find 
'such a meaning in section 2346(d) when it says merely that no 
conservatee may be sterilized under the division. 
There are perhaps other provisions, such as the "medically 
required treatment" procedures under section 2357,1113 which 
might be read to permit the court to authorize sterilization of a 
coriservatee under certain circumstances. However, even these 
provisions could be read to be limited by section 2356(d), in 
light of the fundamental nature of procreative rights. 
Certainly, as the court concludes, an elevated standard of 
proof is essential in a case which threatens a fundamental right. 
Th~ court requires clear and convincing evidence of medical ne-
cessity and a finding that a hysterectomy is the least instrusive 
means of achieving the objective. However, the line between a 
"medically and socially indicated" hysterectomy and one which 
is "medically necessary" may prove to be a difficult one for 
courts to draw by any standard of proof. The situation is even 
more hazardous when the conservatee actually refuses to consent 
and is also found to be incapable of doing so. It should be kept 
in mind that a person who is considered "normal" would be al-
lowed to choose to take the 20 percent chance that .she might 
not develop cervical cancer in order to preserve her fundamental 
right to bear children. 
152. Law Revision Commission Comment to CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d). 
153. These were enacted in 1979 (one year after Tulley) and became effective on 
January 1, 1981. 
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E. PATERNITY ACTIONS 
1. Constitutionality of conclusive presumption of 
paternity 
In re Marriage of B., 124 Cal. App. 3d 524, 177 Cal. Rptr. 
429 (2d Dist. 1981); Watkins v. Riley 83 D.A.R. 182 (4th Dist. 
1983). In In re Marriage of B., the court of appeal rejected a 
constitutional challenge to Evidence Code section 621 as it was 
amended effective September 30, 1980. Although a tissue-typing 
test conclusively demonstrated that a husband was not the bio-
logical father of his wife's child, the court held that such a test 
could not overcome the conclusive presumption of section 621 
when the child was over two years old at the time the husband 
filed for dissolution of his marriage and sought to establish non-
paternity. In Watkins v. Riley, the court declared section 621 
unconstitutional as applied to a six year old child's attempt to 
establish paternity in her mother's husband. 1M 
In In re Marriage of B., husband filed a petition for dissolu-
tion of his marriage and subsequently amended the petition to 
delete the allegation that a minor child had been born of the 
marriage. The child was over two years old at the time of filing, 
and had been conceived while husband, not impotent at the 
time, was living with child's mother. At trial, husband sought to 
introduce an HLA testUU1 which demonstrated that he could not 
be the biological father. He challenged the constitutionality of 
Evidence Code section 621/116 under which the trial court held 
him conclusively presumed to be the father and therefore liable 
for child support. Husband appealed. 
In Watkins, plaintiff minor child sought to establish the pa-
ternity of her mother's current husband. At trial, she requested 
blood tests to establish that her mother's ex-husband (defen-
dant), with whom her mother lived when daughter was con-
ceived, was not her natural father. Without ordering the blood 
154. See also, Estate of Cornelius, 133 Cal. App. 3d 684, 184 Cal. Rptr. 148 (4th 
Dist. 1982) h'g. granted Sept. 8, 1982 (L.A. 31631) (upholding constitutionality of section 
621 as applied to adult child of deceased alleged natural father). 
155. Human leucocyte antigen test, a tissue grouping test done on mother, child, 
and alleged father. Such test establishes only whether the man is one who could be the 
biological father. 
156. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (Deering 1983). 
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tests, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment pursuant to section 621's conclusive presumption. 
Plaintiff appealed. 
Section 621 (a) establishes a conclusive presumption of pa-
ternity in a husband when a child is born of his wife with whom 
he cohabits. Notwithstanding that presumption, subsections (b), 
(c) and (d) of section 621 allow such husband, or the child's 
mother,lII'7 to establish non-paternity if "all the experts" con-
clude as a result of blood tests that he could not be the father. 
But under subsections (c) and (d), the husband or mother must 
raise the notice of motion for blood tests within two years of the 
child's birth or the presumption remains intact. As to all others, 
including the child, the presumption is conclusive and may not 
be challenged with blood tests. 
The presumption was first justified by the courts on the 
ground that no competent evidence existed to prove who was the 
biological father of a child.1II8 After blood test evidence became 
scientifically reliable, the California Supreme Court, in Kusior v. 
Silver,1a9 continued to uphold the presumption as a "substantive 
rule of law."lso Such rule was based on the public policy of pro-
tecting the legitimacy of children born to married people who 
live together, regardless of the identities of their biological fa-
thers. lsl Section 621(b) was adopted in 1980, perhaps in recogni-
tion of the fact that, after a certain age the identities of chil-
dren's biological parents lose importance in comparison with the 
identities of those who have "parented" them. ls2 Section 621 as 
157. The child's mother may establish the non-paternity of her husband only if the 
child's biological father files an affidavit acknowledging paternity. 
158. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1972) (irrebuttable presumption un-
constitutional when not necessarily and universally true in fact and when reasonable 
alternative means to make crucial determination exist). 
159. 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960). 
160. In other words, even though it is conclusively proved he is not the biological 
father, a man can still be a child's legal father if the conditions of section 621 exist. See 
Jackson v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 245, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967). 
161. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d at 249-50, 430 P.2d at 291-92, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52 
(Burke, J. dissenting). See also, County of San Diego v. Brown, 80 Cal. App. 3d 297, 303, 
145 Cal. Rptr. 483, 486 (1978) (purposes of § 621 are to uphold the integrity of the fam-
ily, protect the child from the stigma of illegitimacy, protect the child's welfare, and keep 
the child off welfare rolls). 
162. See Recent Developments, California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the 
Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754 (1968) (suggesting just such 
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amended may have been a compromise between recognizing the 
reliability of blood tests and encouraging the continuance of and 
responsibility toward developed parent-child relationships. 
In In re Lisa R./63 the California Supreme Court found a 
similar presumption16• to be unconstitutional as applied to a 
child's biological father seeking to establish his own paternity. 
The court held that the father's interest in presenting evidence 
where his claim of paternity arose from more than the mere bio-
logical relationship161i overcame the state's interest in speed and 
efficiency of judicial proceedings.166 
In Marriage of B., husband challenged the constitutionality 
of section 621 as amended, on two grounds: (1) that the deci-
sional law upholding the original section had developed before 
the sophistication of blood tests became reliable to the point of 
conclusiveness, and that the section now works a denial of due 
process since there is no longer a relationship between the pre-
sumption and the fact sought to be presumed; and (2) that as a 
husband with a child over two years old at the time the section 
was amended, he was denied equal protection of the laws by the 
limitation imposed by section 621(c). 
The court rejected both of husband's contentions. First, as 
to the due process claim, it noted that Kusior had not been 
overruled and held it is as applicable to the legislature's reten-
tion of the presumption, apparently for public policy reasons, as 
it had been to the original presumption itself. The court inter-
preted the two year limit as merely a remedial statute of limita-
a rule as § 621 as amended, for the reasons stated above). 
163. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975) cert. den. sub. nom. 
Porzuczek, Guardian v. Towner, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885 (1975). 
164. CAL. EVID. CODE § 661 (Deering 1966) repealed by Act of October I, 1975, ch. 
1244, § 14, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3194. (child of a married woman presumed to be legitimate 
and such presumption may be disputed only by the state, husband, wife or a decedent of 
one or both of them, thus making such presumption conclusive as to the alleged natural 
father). 
165. Here, father had lived with child's mother both before and after child's birth, 
had contributed support and attempted to visit the child, the mother had used the fa-
ther's name, and his name appeared on the child's birth certificate. 
166. The state's interests in strengthening family ties, preventing the stigma of ille-
gitimacy, and keeping families intact were held to be non-applicable to this case as both 
mother and her husband were dead and father had shown an intent to legitimate his 
daughter. 
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tions which does not destroy fundamental rights. Second, on 
husband's equal protection claim, the court held that because 
the statute of limitations did not deprive him of a vested right, 
but was merely a limitation on a, newly created right, it was 
constitutional. 
In Watkins, plaintiff child claimed: (1) that because there 
were more reliable methods of determining paternity than 
presuming it to be true, the presumption as applied to her vio-
lated due process; and (2) that because the statute denied her 
the fundamental right to "establish a relationship with a par-
ent,1Il87 it denied her equal protection of the laws. 
Recognizing the substantive nature of section 621, the court 
nevertheless distinguished this case from Marriage of B. on the 
due process claim, by holding that the presumption as applied 
here did not further the section's underlying policies of promot-
ing the integrity of the family unit, preventing the stigma of ille-
gitimacy, and ensuring support of the child. The court found 
that allowing plaintiff to establish paternity in her mother's cur-
rent husband would promote the integrity of the family unit in 
which she was residing, and that there was no danger of illegiti-
macy or non-support where her alleged natural father had vol-
untarily assumed the parent role. 
On the equal protection claim, the court held that the stat-
ute distinguished between the class of children and that of 
mothers and presumed fathers, thereby denying the child the 
fundamental right to establish a relationship with a parent. Be-
cause section 621 as applied here did not fulfill its own objec-
tives, the court could find no compelling state interest to justify 
such a denial. 
The court in Watkins concluded by noting that the policies 
discussed in Marriage of B. upholding section 621's statute of 
limitations might also apply to a child seeking to establish pa-
ternity, but that it was unconstitutional to deny the child all 
rights to establish such a relationship. 
The court's differing treatment of Marriage of B. and Wat-
167. See Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 277-78, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1979). 
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kins seems to derive mainly from the fact that in Marriage of B., 
a man sought to avoid paternity, whereas in Watkins, (and Lisa 
R.) plaintiffs sought to legitimate an existing family relation-
ship. It is apparent that in the latter situation, the justifications 
for section 621 's conclusive presumption of paternity no longer 
outweigh the conclusiveness of sophisticated blood tests. 
F. MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Meretricious relationship is not "remarriage" justify-
ing termination of spousal support 
In re Marriage of Sasson, 129 Cal. App .. 3d 140, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 815 (2d Dist. 1982). In In re Marriage of Sasson, the court 
of appeal held that an ex-wife who was living in a meretricious 
relationship, and representing herself to family and friends as 
married, was not "remarried" for purposes of terminating the 
non-modifiable spousal support award paid by her ex-husband. 
The court rejected the ex-husband's contentions that under Cal-
ifornia Civil Code section 4801.5 his ex-wife's cohabitation was 
tantamount to marriage and that it was inequitable to allow her 
to collect spousal support while she was involved in a meretri-
cious relationship. 
Upon dissolution of their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Sasson 
(ex-husband and ex-wife) agreed upon an unequivocally non-
modifiable support award which would terminate upon the 
death of either ex-spouse, the ex-wife's remarriage or the pas-
sage of eight years, whichever came first. Since that time, the ex~ 
wife had begun cohabiting with another man whose name she 
regularly used. She and the man had a baby who was also given 
his name. They shared a joint bank account into which she de-
posited her spousal support checks, and they represented to 
family and friends that they were married. They were, however, 
never actually married. 
Upon the trial court's denial of his request for termination 
of spousal support, the ex-husband appealed, alleging that the 
trial court erred in defining "marriage" narrowly as de jure or 
putative marriage, in excluding reputation evidence, and in rul-
ing that Civil Code section 4801.5 was inapplicable where the 
parties had agreed to a non-modifiable support award. 
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The court of appeal held that it would contravene public 
policy to broaden the definition of marriage beyond that pre-
scribed in Civil Code sections 4100166, 4101169, 4104170, 4213171 
and 4425.172 According to these sections, marriage requires not 
only consent, but also solemnization, and usually a license. 
In light of this limited definition, the court also upheld the 
trial court's exclusion of reputation evidence. Although such evi-
dence is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule,173 it simply 
is of little relevance where by definition the ex-husband must 
prove solemnization as well as consent. 
Furthermore, the court rejected the ex-husband's conten-
tion that the legislature, through Civil Code section 4801.5, m 
had demonstrated an intent to treat cohabitation as the 
equivalent of ,marriage for purposes of terminating support. At 
one time, section 4801.5 did mandate revocation of support upon 
proof that supported ex-spouses were cohabiting and holding 
themselves out as being married. However, it was amended in 
19761711 to create a rebuttable presumption of a decreased need 
for support when supported ex-spouses cohabit, even when they 
do not represent themselves as being married. This section does 
not apply if the parties have agreed otherwise in writing. 
In In re Marriage of Harris , 176 the court held that a non-
modifiable support award similar to the one in Sa.sson, could not 
be terminated when the ex-wife was cohabiting, though not rep-
resenting herself as married. The court reasoned that the exis-
tence of sufficient facts to invoke section 4801.5 is not equal to 
marriage, especially since the parties could have had the benefit 
of the section simply by making their support agreement 
168. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (Deering 1983). 
169. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (Deering 1983). 
170. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (Deering 1983). 
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4213 (Deering 1983). 
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425 (Deering 1972) (sets up conditions under which facially 
valid marriages are voidable.) Without citing to it, the court also made reference to sec-
tion 4426, which makes marriages suffering from section 4425 defects valid if not chal-
lenged within a specified period. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426 (Deering 1983). 
173. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1314 (Deering 1966). 
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (Deering 1983). 
175. Act of July 8, 1976, ch. 380, § I, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1028. 
176. 65 Cal. App. 3d 143, 134 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1976). 
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modifiable. 177 
The Sasson court reasoned similarly that: 1) the 1976 
amendment of section 4801.5 clarified the legislature's intent 
that cohabitation, even when a couple represents themselves as 
married, is not the equivalent of marriage; and 2) section 4801.5 
is inapplicable to a non-modifiable spousal support award be-
cause the parties had "agreed otherwise in writing" to forego its 
protection. 
The court also rejected the ex-husband's contention that it 
was inequitable to allow the ex-wife to "get the best of both 
worlds" by living as if she were married, but continuing to re-
ceive spousal support. The court pointed out the many benefits 
one foregoes when one chooses not to get married (i.e., state 
death benefits) and characterized the ex-wife's decision to con-
tinue receiving support as choice between two packages of bene-
fits and detriments rather than as an attempt to hoard only 
benefits. 
In light of courts' refusal to expand the narrow definition of 
marriage to the benefit of. a meretricious spouse in such con-
texts as state benefits and wrongful death,I78 it certainly would 
have been inequitable to have expanded it here to ex-wife's 
detriment. 
Marriage, as defined by the Sasson court, is limited to de 
jure or putative marriage and neither reputation evidence, nor 
the rebuttable presumption in Civil Code section 4801.5, nor the 
alleged inequity of allowing a meretricious spouse to receive 
spousal support serves to change that definition. 
2. Administrative Code section limiting prisoners' conju-
gal visits to bona fide family relationships upheld 
In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal. 
177. See also In re Marriage of Leib, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629,145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978) 
(reduction of modifiable support award granted only after ex-wife failed to overcome the 
4801.5 presumption since her cohabitation by itself was insufficient to revoke or reduce 
her award). 
178. See Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal. Rptr. 390 
(1982). But see Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 
(1983). 
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Rptr. 826 (1982). In In re Cummings, the California Supreme 
Court rejected a prisoner's challenge to Administrative Code 
section 3174 limiting overnight family visitation privileges to bo-
nafide family relationships established through "blood, marriage 
or adoption." The Court held that Penal Code section 2600, 
granting prisoners all civil rights that do not interfere with rea-
sonable security, did not render section 3174 arbitrary and un-
reasonable when applied to a prisoner who wished overnight vis-
itation privileges with a woman and her daughter with whom he 
had lived for seven years. 
Plaintiff prisoner, an inmate serving a life sentence, sought 
family visitation rights with a woman and her daughter with 
whom he had been living the seven years prior to his arrest. The 
couple was not married, nor was the child his natural or adopted 
daughter. The relationship had continued during the period of 
plaintiff's incarceration by way of letters and daytime visits. The 
Department of Corrections denied conjugal visits based on Ad-
ministrative Code section 3174.179 In this Habeas Corpus action, 
plaintiff attempted to have the regulation declared invalid under 
Penal Code section 2600.180 
Administrative Code section 3174 provides in pertinent 
part: 
The family visiting plan will extend such visits to 
as many inmates as possible commensurate with 
institution security. . . . (a) For the purposes of 
family visiting . . . immediate family members 
are defined as the inmate's legal spouse; natural 
parents; adoptive parents. . . step-parents or fos-
ter parents; grandparents; brothers and sisters; 
the inmate's natural and adoptive children; step-
children or grandchildren. 181 
Penal Code section 2600, as amended in 1975, provides in perti-
nent part: "A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state 
prison may. . . be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, 
as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable. . . protec-
179. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, R. 3174 (1982). 
180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (Deering 1980). 
181. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, R. 3174 (1982). 
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tion of the public."lS2 In In re Price/s3 the California Supreme 
Court allowed only a consideration of reasonable institutional 
security or public protection in determining whether or not a 
prisoner's civil rights were to be denied. Recognizing prison se-
curity as a legitimate state interest, the court banned a visit by 
outside members of the Prisoner's Union as a security risk. ls4 
The Court in Cummings did not focus on the question of 
security, but rather focused on the reasonableness of section 
3174 and whether it was consistent with a legitimate state inter-
est. lSII Holding that Penal Code section 2600 should not be "a 
straightjacket limiting the ability of the prison authorities to 
deal with institutional realities," the Court ignored the question 
of security which is, according to section 2600, the perspective 
from which the reasonableness of section 3174 must be judged. 
To justify its position, the Court erroneously relied on cases de-
cided prior to 1975 when the "civil death" presumption was 
abolished. ls8 
Justice Bird concurred with the court's judgment but not 
with its reasoning. She focused directly on the issue ignored by 
the majority and concluded that without a reasonable method 
for determining what constitutes a bona fide alternative family, 
a policy allowing meretricious conjugal visits would present se-
182. A profound result of the 1975 amendment to section 2600 was that it reversed 
the presumption of "civil death," or suspension of all civil rights of a person sentenced to 
state prison. In re Price, 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979). Prior 
to 1975, section 2600 read in pertinent part: "A sentence of imprisonment in a state 
prison for any term suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced. . . . But the 
Adult Authority may restore . . . such civil rights as the authority may deem 
proper .... " CAL. PENAL CODE §, 2600 (Deering 1971). 
183. 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873. 
184. Other cases in which the Supreme Court utilized the "reasonable security" test 
are: In re Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d 131, 599 P.2d 86, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979) and In re 
Brandt, 25 Cal. 3d 136, 599 P.2d 89, 157 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1979). In these cases, the Court 
held that a mere conjecture of security problems by the prison officials is not enough to 
justify denying rights, but that a clear showing of something more than simple disap-
proval of the activity is required. 
185. In determining whether preventing conjugal visits between unmarried people is 
a "legitimate state interest," the court expressed concerns about using taxpayers' money 
to "provide overnight housing accommodations and security supervision for a prison in-
mate with his or her paramour." The use of the word "paramour" is demonstrative of the 
majority's bias. It is defined as: "an illicit lover; esp. MISTRESS." WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 611 (7th ed. 1965). 
186. In re van Geldern, 5 Cal. 3d 832, 489 P.2d 578, 97 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1971); In re 
Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970). 
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curity problems and inherent administrative difficulties. 
Dissenting Justice Newman accurately noted that the ma-
jority. did not base its holding on a finding of need for reasonable 
security. He also pointed out that prison officials are currently 
making decision about whether a bona fide family exists in re-
gard to other relationships.187 The dissent questioned whether 
the legislature meant to authorize the Department to exclude 
members of a stable, alternative family while at the same time 
allowing visits by aunts, uncles and cousins of a bona fide foster 
family. He disagreed with Justice Bird's conclusion that reasona-
ble security justified the restriction, noting that allowing mere-
tricious family visits might actually foster law-abiding behavior 
after release because family ties had been nourished during 
incarceration. 
The majority in Cummings basically ignored Penal Code 
section 2600 in upholding Administrative Code section 3174 
merely because it was "reasonable" and consistent with a "legiti-
mate state interest." By doing so, it denied a prisoner's civil 
rights without tying such denial to reasonable security or public 
protection as required by section 2600. 
III. PROPERTY LAW 
A. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
1. Landlord may not maintain separate financial stand-
ards for married and unmarried applicants 
Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 138 Cal. 
App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (lst Dist. 1983). In Hess v. Fair 
Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), the court of 
appeal held that a landlord's maintenance of separate financial 
standards for married and unmarried applicant couples violated 
the Fair Employment and Housing Act. It also held that the 
FEHC's award of separate damages to each of the aggrieved 
complainants was allowed under the Act. 
187. Section 3174 lists as family members: "Aunts, Uncles, and cousins ... where a 
bona fide foster relationship exists"; and "Adoptive parents, if the adoption occurred and 
a family relationship existed prior to the inmate's incarceration." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
15, R. 3174 (1982). Thus the administrative procedures necessary to determine whether a 
family relationship exists are already intact. 
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Plaintiff landlords rejected the rental application of an un-
married couple based on landlords' policy of requiring each un-
married applicant to qualify separately. The couple was expect-
ing a baby, and because the woman would not work after the 
birth, she could not qualify on her income alone. Landlords sub-
sequently rented to a similarly situated married couple by al-
lowing aggregation of their income, and the rejected couple com-
plained to the Division of Fair Employment Practices.188 At an 
administrative hearing, landlords were found to have unlawfully 
discriminated against the unmarried couple on the basis of mari-
tal status in violation of Government Code section 12955(a),189 
and were ordered to pay each of them $1000. Landlords' petition 
for writ of administrative mandamus was denied and they 
appealed. 
Government Code section 12955(a), a part of the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act,190 makes it an unlawful practice for 
a landlord to discriminate against any person on the basis of 
marital status. Under former Health and Safety Code section 
35720,191 the forerunner of section 12955(a), discrimination 
against unmarried couples has been held to be based on "marital 
status. "191 . 
A similar provision in the federal Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (ECOA)198 prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit 
transaction on the basis of marital statuS.llH In Markham v. Co-
lonial Mort. Servo Co., Associates,l9I the court held that a credi-
tor's refusal to aggregate the incomes of an unmarried couple to 
determine their eligibility for a joint mortgage violated section 
1691(a)(1) of the ECOA, where such aggregation would have 
been allowed a married couple. 
188. Now the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. 
189. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955(a) (Deering 1982). 
190. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (Deering 1982). 
191. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35720 (Deering 1975), amended by Act of Sept. 
30, 1977, ch. 1187, § 5, 1977 Cal. Stat. 3885, repealed by Act of Sept. 19, 1980, ch. 992, § 
8, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3138. 
192. See Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 99, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 375, 381 (1976). . 
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf (1976). 
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976). 
195. 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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Landlords here challenged the holding of discrimination on 
the grounds that: (1) different financial criteria for married and 
unmarried couples without moral judgment is not discrimination 
on the basis of marital status; and (2) it harms their financial 
interests to require a single standard because unmarried people 
are not legally responsible for each other's debts. 
Analogizing to the ECOA, the court held that landlords' 
policy discriminated solely on the basis of marital status. The 
court also held that landlords' claim of potential financial harm 
was not a legitimate business interest justifying the policy since 
each tenant may be held personally liable for the entire rent. 
At the time of the administrative hearing, Government 
Code section 12987(2)196 authorized the FEHC to order the 
"payment of actual and punitive damages to the aggrieved per-
son in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1000)."197 
However, section 12925(d)198 defines "person" for purposes of 
the Act to include "one or more individuals." 
Landlords argued that these two sections combined indi-
cated a legislative intent to limit damages to $1000 for anyone 
instance of discrimination by defining the complaining couple as 
one "aggrieved person." The court rejected this contention in re-
liance on a California Attorney. General's opinion199 deciding the 
same question as to former Health and Safety Code section 
35738,200 the forerunner to section 12987. That decision held 
that the Act's definition of "person" did not apply to section 
35738 so as to limit its maximum aggregate award of damages, 
and that the term "aggrieved person" had come to indicate indi-
vidual relief on both a statewide and a nationwide basis in a va-
riety of civil rights contexts. The court agreed that a reading 
such as landlords' would "defeat the intent of the Legislature, 
196. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987(2) (Deering 1982) amended by Act of Sept. 27, 1981, 
ch. 899, § 3, 1981 Cal. Stat. 505. 
197. Section 12987(2) was amended between the time of the hearing and the appeal 
to read, "The payment of punitive damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand 
dollars ($1000) ... and the payment of actual damages." 
198. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12925(d) (Deering 1982). 
199. Opinion No. SO 72-35, 56 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 338 (1973). 
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35738 (Deering 1975), repealed by Act of Sept. 
19, 1980, ch. 992, § 8, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3138. 
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hinder the implementation of. . . public policy. . and contro-
vert the clear meaning of prior statutory schemes. "201 
2. Landlord's discrimination against homosexuals violates 
Unruh Act 
Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. 
Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1982). The court in Hu-
bert v. Williams applied Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson201 to 
hold that homosexuals are a class protected from arbitrary dis-
crimination under the Unruh Act. Thus, a landlord may not ar-
bitrarily evict homosexual tenants or tenants who associate with 
homosexuals. 
Plaintiffs-appellants were a quadriplegic man (Hubert) and 
his live-in attendant (Kelly), a lesbian. They sued their former 
landlord under the Unruh Civil Rights Actl03 after he evicted 
them, allegedly because Kelly was a homosexual and Hubert as-
sociated with homosexuals. The trial court sustained the land-
lord's demurrer, holding that the complaint did not state a cause 
of action under the Unruh Act. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Unruh Act reads in pertinent part: "All persons within 
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter 
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of 
every kind whatsoever."I04 
The history of California's public accommodations laws,lo, 
which were precursors of the Unruh Act, reveals that the first 
codification of those laws did not include suspect classes, but 
prohibited any arbitrary discrimination in certain listed busi-
nesses and "all other places of public accommodation."2" Until 
1959, the main amendments to the public accommodations laws 
201. 56 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. at 338. 
202. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal, Rptr. 496 (1982) (families with children 
protected by Unruh Act from arbitrary discrimination in rental housing). 
203. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 1983). 
204. 1d. 
205. As recited in In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, (1970). 
206. Act of March 13, 1897, ch. 108, § 1,1897 Cal. Stat. 137; Cox, Cal. 3d at 213, 474 
P.2d at 996, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 28. 
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expanded upon the types of businesses listed. The courts ap-
plied this statute to protect some classes of people not eventu-
ally listed in the Unruh Act, including homosexuals.2 0 7 Accord-
ing to the California Supreme Court in In re Cox, the Unruh Act 
arose out of a concern that the courts were too narrowly defining 
the types of businesses covered by the statutes. Thus, the Unruh 
Act explicitly covered "all business establishments of any kind 
whatsoever." Based on the above history, the California Su-
preme Court has held in several cases that the legislature in-
tended the Unruh Act suspect classes to be illustrative rather 
than restrictive.208 
The Hubert court considered Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson 
to be fully dispositive of the issues in Hubert. In Wolfson, the 
California Supreme Court held that the Unruh Act prevented 
landlords from refusing to rent to families solely because they 
included minor children. Such refusal was held to be arbitrary 
discrimination, all forms of which were prohibited not with-
standing the fact that they were not among the particular forms 
quoted in the Act itself. The Hubert court held that discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual preference was also such prohibited 
arbitrary discrimination and remanded for a determination of 
whether the eviction was reasonable, based on Hubert's and 
Kelly's actual conduct. 
The court further supported its finding that homosexuals 
are a class protected by the Unruh Act by citing Stoumen v. 
Reilly,209 in which the State Board of Equalization was prohib-
ited from withholding a liquor license from a bar and restaurant 
merely because it served a gay clientele. Dicta in that case indi-
cated that the proprietor would be liable in damages to homo-
sexuals if he excluded them on the basis of their sexual prefer-
ence. The Hubert court also noted that other statutes 
207. Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951) (right of homosexuals to 
frequent bar and restaurant recognized, so that proprietor's liquor license could not be 
dependent upon his excluding them). Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 
227 P.2d 449 (1951) (race track customer may not be excluded solely for reputation as an 
"immoral character"). 
208. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 
(1982); In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); cf. Gay Law 
Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 
(1979). 
209. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969. 
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prohibiting arbitrary discrimination had been held to apply to 
discrimination against homosexuals, even when they were not 
listed as a protected class in such statutes.210 Finally, the court 
held that since homosexuals are protected by the Unruh Act, the 
right to associate with homosexuals is also protected.211 
It has long been public policy in California to prohibit all 
forms of arbitrary discrimination. Discrimination against homo-
sexuals has been successfully challenged as arbitrary in contexts 
other than rental housing, and other forms of arbitrary discrimi-
nation have been prohibited in a rental housing context. Hubert 
v. Williams correctly applies this policy to prohibit arbitrary 
discrimination against homosexuals in a rental .housing context. 
B. RETALIATORY EVICTION 
1. Eviction for reporting criminal acts of landlord is 
retaliatory 
Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 244, 636 P.2d 582, 178 
Cal. Rptr. 618 (1981). In Barela v. Superior Court, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court extended the availabiliy of the retaliatory 
eviction defense to tenants evicted in retaliation for reporting 
criminal acts of their landlords. The court allowed a tenant to 
raise the defense when her landlord evicted her in alleged retali-
ation for reporting to the police that he had sexually abused her 
nine-year-old daughter. 
Defendant tenant reported to the police tht her landlord 
had sexually molested her daughter. Seven days later, plaintiff 
landlord began procedures which eventually led to an unlawful 
detainer action against defendant.lI12 The trial court found both 
that the eviction was caused by defendant's complaint to the po-
lice, and that the criminal trial against plaintiff had made it im-
210. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 475-78, 595 
P.2d 592, 602-04, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25-26 (1979) (Cal. Public Utilities Code § 453(a) 
banning arbitrary discrimination by a public utility held to prohibit arbitrary employ-
ment discrimination against homosexuals). 
211. See also Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d 125, 128-29, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20, 21-
22 (1976) (Unruh Act protected tenants from an eviction based solely on their sub-let-
ting to blacks). 
212. Plaintiff's "procedures" included raising defendant's rent from $200.00 to 
$650.00 without notice, serving her with a legally ineffective 3 day notice to "pay rent or 
quit," and later with a 30 day termination notice. 
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possible for the parties to live near one another. But, it did not 
recognize defendant's right to a retaliatory eviction defense 
under Civil Code section 1942.5213 or under California case 
law,214 and awarded plaintiff restitution of the premises and 
back rent. Defendant appealed. 
In general, affirmative defenses are not allowed in unlawful 
detainer actions because of the need to protect the summary na-
ture of such proceedings.2lI! However, some exceptions have 
emerged, including that of retaliatory eviction. The defense has 
been developed along both common law and statutory lines. 
It was first allowed at common law when landlords retali-
ated against tenants who exercised repair and deduct rights,216 
and was later expanded to include retaliation against tenants 
who filed suit against their landlords under statutes that de-
pended upon such suits for their enforcement.217 In S.P. Growers 
Ass'n v. Rodriguez,218 the court promulgated a test for determin-
ing the availability of a retaliatory eviction defense: the public 
policies furthered by allowing the defense must outweigh the 
state's interest in summary unlawful detainer proceedings. 
The defense was first codified in 1970 as Civil Code section 
1942.5219 applying to retaliations against tenants who exercised 
"repair and deduct" rights under section 1942.220 In 1979, sec-
tion 1942.5 was repealed and reenacted in expanded form to al-
low the defense when landlords retaliate against tenants for, 
213. CAL. CIY. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1981). 
214. See S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 761 (1976) (retaliatory eviction is valid defense when defendant's eviction was al-
legedly in retaliation for filing suit against landlord under Farm Labor Contractor Regu-
lation Act). 
215. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 632-34, 517 P.2d 1168, 1178-80, 
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 714-16 (1974); Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 721, 84 
Cal. Rptr. 756, 760 (1970). 
216. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 
(1970). 
217. S.P. Growers, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761. 
218. 1d. 
219. Act of Sept. 16, 1970, ch. 1280, § 5, 1970 Cal. Stat. 2314 (codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1942.5) (repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1979, ch. 652, § I, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2005) (re-
enacted by Act of Sept. 14, 1979, ch. 652, § 2, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2005) (codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1980». 
220. CAL. CIY. CODE § 1942 (Deering 1981). 
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among other things, "lawfully and peacefully exercis[ing) any 
rights under the law." 
The supreme court held here that it was improper under 
both common law and statutory analyses not to allow the de-
fense. It also held defendant to be successful in defending 
against the unlawful detainer action under both analyses. 
Under a common law analysis, the court held that the pub-
lic policies of protecting children from abuse, and of ensuring 
that criminal laws are enforced, and that victims and police in-
formants are protected from retaliation outweigh the need for 
summary proceedings. In any event, the court concluded, any 
delay would not be of the complex and protracted nature feared 
in other types of cases.221 
The court noted that as a remedial statute, section 1942.5 
must be construed liberally to effect its objectives. Since Califor-
nia has long protected the rights of its citizens to report 
crimes,222 the court held that such right is within the meaning of 
the "[lawful) and [peaceful) exercise [of] any rights under the 
law" found in section 1942.5. 
The supreme court upheld a tenant's right to claim a retali-
atory eviction defense when she was evicted for reporting her 
landlord's criminal acts to the police. In so doing, it correctly 
reasoned that, "[t)o hold otherwise would be to create a special 
class of criminals - those who also happen to be landlords - with 
a legally sanctioned means of punishing the victims or witnesses 
of their crime [sic)."22a 
IV. TORT LAW 
A. CIVIL DAMAGES FOR RAPE 
1. Civil damages to husband and wife for rape of wife 
Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 
221. See Union Oil Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (retaliatory eviction 
defense not allowed where service station lessee was evicted in alleged retaliation for 
refusing to accede to plaintiff lessor's scheme to breach anti-trust laws). 
222. See Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222, 228, 28 P. 937, 938 (1892); CAL. PEN. CODE § 
136.1(b)(l) (Deering 1983). 
223. Barela, 30 Cal. 3d at 244, 636 P.2d at 582, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 618. 
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(2d Dist. 1982). In Delia S. v. Torres, the court of appeal upheld 
a jury verdict awarding a husband and wife damages for rape of 
the wife by a friend of the family. The court rejected defen-
dant's challenges of the admission of expert testimony concern-
ing the reactions of rape victims and the motives and character-
istics of rapists, and the exclusion of evidence of the victim's 
sexual conduct. It also held that allowing the victim to recover 
separate damages for both battery and the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, was not an impermissible double recovery. 
In addition, the court allowed an award of damages to the vic-
tim's husband for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
although he was not present when his wife was raped. 
Plaintiffs, a married couple, were close friends of defendant 
and his wife. Both couples were active in the same cultural-so-
cial group, and saw each other socially on many occasions. After 
leaving plaintiff husband at the airport on one occasion, defen-
dant raped plaintiff wife at knife point in the back seat of his 
car. She kept the rape a secret from her husband for approxi-
mately a month and a half because she was ashamed, humili-
ated, and frightened. During that time, defendant advised plain-
tiff husband that plaintiff wife "needed psychiatric care." After 
his wife told him of the rape, husband confronted defendant, 
who admitted to the incident and promised to pay for plaintiff 
wife to have an abortion. When defendant subsequently refused 
to pay for the abortion, approximately two months after the 
rape occurred, plaintiffs reported the rape to the police. 
At trial, defendant testified tht plaintiff wife had consented 
to have intercourse with him and that they had in fact been hav-
ing an affair. He claimed that he had not admitted to raping 
plaintiff wife, but that he had agreed to pay for the abortion 
because of their affair. He also introduced evidence of his status 
as a close friend, a professional person, and a community leader. 
The court entered judgment on a jury verdict that defendant 
had committed a battery against plaintiff wife in the form of a 
rape, had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on both 
plaintiffs, and that plaintiff husband had suffered a loss of con-
sortium as a result of the rape. 
Defendant's assertions on appeal included: (1) that the ad-
mission of expert testimony concerning the reactions of rape vic-
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tims and the motives and character of rapists was prejudicial er-
ror under section 352 of the Evidence Code224; (2) that plaintiff 
wife's recovery for both battery and the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress was an impermissible "double recovery"; and 
(3) that plaintiff husband's recovery for the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress was improper as a recovery for a "wrong 
committed on another. "2211 
Evidence Code section 801(a)228 limits expert testimony to 
subjects that are beyond common experience. Section 352 gives 
the trial court discretion to exclude evidence when its probative 
value is outweighed by its potential for prejudice, confusion or 
misleading of jurors. 
In People v. Clark,227 admission of an expert police witness' 
testimony was found to be prejudicial error under section 352 in 
a criminal trial for forcible rape.228 The Delia S. court rejected 
defendant's contention that it was prejudicial error to admit the 
expert testimony here. It reasoned, per section 801(a), .that al-
though we all hold opinions as to the reactions of rape victims 
and the motives and character of rapist, they may be grossly er-
roneous. It held that such subjects are "not within the common 
knowledge of jurors." 
Also, while the evidence was found to be irrelevant in Clark, 
it was held to be highly relevant here because the "penultimate 
issue ... was one of witness credibility."229 The court therefore 
224. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 1966). 
225. Defendant also challenged several jury instructions which the court upheld 
summarily because they correctly stated the law, and because defendant had not re-
quested clarifying instructions at trial. Such challenges were, therefore, held to be waived 
on appeal. 
226. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (Deering 1966). 
227. 109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 167 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1980). 
228. The expert testified in response to a hypothetical based on the facts of the 
case, that the amount of resistance shown by the victim was reasonable under all the 
circumstances. The Clark court cited People v. Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. 
Rptr. 376 (1980), in which the admissioll of similar evidence was also found to be in 
error. In Guthreau, the court held that the proper inquiry was not whether the victim's 
resistance was reasonable, but whether her acts of resistance made reasonably manifest 
her refusal to consent. The goal of the inquiry was to determine whether defendant had 
a bona fide reasonable belief that the victim consented. 
229. Where in Clark and Guthreau the issue was whether, under all the circum- . 
stances, the defendant's alleged belief in the victim's consent was reasonable, the ques-
tion here was precisely what "all the circumstances" were, or which party's version of the 
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held that the expert testimony was relevant as a backdrop 
against which to view the parties' testimonies. 
Specifically, the court held that the evidence on the reac-
tions of rape victims was relevant in light of defendant's theory 
that plaintiff wife's conduct was inconsistent with that of a rape 
victim. Such testimony was not held to be prejudicial since it 
simply reported general information on common reactions of 
rape victims. The evidence on the motives and character of rap-
ists carried more prejudicial potential, but the court held that its 
probative value far outweighed such potential. It found defen-
dant's emphasis on his status as a friend, a professional person, 
and a community leader, presumably to suggest that he was not 
the "type" to commit a rape, significant. Thus, evidence tending 
to dispel common myths about the "types" who rape, was of 
great probative value. Again, its prejudicial potential was miti-
gated by the fact that it was generally, rather than specifically, 
oriented toward defendant's conduct or personality. 
In People v. Guthreau,230 the court excluded evidence of the 
victim's past sexual conduct with men other than the defendant 
as irrelevant to the issue of consent under Evidence Code sec-
tion l103(b)(1).1l81 The Delia S. court held that the consent issue 
is the same in a civil context as in a criminal context, and there-
fore upheld the exclusion of evidence of plaintiff wife's past sex-
ual conduct with men other than the defendant. 
Defendant's "double recovery" challenge grew out of the 
fact that damages for both the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and battery include "any pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety 
and other distress." The court held it was not an impermissible 
double recovery for the jury to award plaintiff wife separate 
damages for the emotional distress caused by defendant's abuse 
and manipUlation of their friendship and his position of trust 
and influence. It also held that his subsequent acts, including 
telling plaintiff husband that his wife needed psychiatric care, 
circumstances was to be believed. 
230. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 444, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 380. See a/so People v. Blackburn, 56 
Cal. App. 3d 685, 690, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1976). 
231. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1l03(b)(1) (Deering 1983) (opinion evidence, reputation evi-
dence and evidence of past sexual conduct with men other than defendant not admissi-
ble to prove consent in a criminal rape trial). 
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would support an independent recovery for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.232 
The court also rejected defendant's contention that the trial 
court had allowed plaintiff husband to recover for a wrong "com-
mitted on another." An action for an unauthorized autopsy on 
the body of a spouse has been held to be a personal action aris-
ing from the plaintiff's relationship with the deceased and the 
effect of the autopsy on the plaintiff personally.233 The court 
held that the same was true of plaintiff's husband's action for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the 
rape of his wife. 
The most striking aspect of the decision in Delia S. v. 
Torres, is the court's admission of evidence as to the reactions of 
. rape victims and the motives and character of rapists. Although 
such evidence has as yet been excluded from criminal rape trials, 
the court recognized that "[i]t was vital that the jury have as 
realistic a view as possible of the manner in which rape victims 
react to the experience and the motives for rape, to the end that 
the jury not decide the credibility issue on the basis of extrane-
ous factors or personal misconceptions."234 These observations 
would seem to be equally applicable to criminal rape trials, 
where the consent defense is likely to be based on many of the 
same elements that were asserted here. It remains to be seen 
whether this case might be followed by similar analyses in the 
criminal sphere. 
B. MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Wrongful death suit for death of meretricious spouse 
not allowed 
Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 
Cal. Rptr. 390 (2d Dist. 1982); Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138 
Cal. App. 3d 464, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (2d Dist. 1983). Two courts 
of appeal have held that a woman cannot sue under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 377 fur the wrongful death of her mere-
232. The court made this analysis although it had already held that defendant had 
waived his right to challenge the allegedlY faulty jury instructions. 
233. Huntly v. Zurich Gen. Accident and Liab. Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201, 280 P. 
163 (1929). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868, comment a (1979). 
234. Delia S., 134 Cal. App. 3d at 485, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796. 
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tricious spouse. In Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co. and Nieto v. 
City of Los Angeles, the courts followed prior California deci-
sions refusing to expand the wrongful death statute absent an 
unconstitutional limitation. Both courts held that under rational 
basis scrutiny, no such unconstitutional limitation existed as to 
meretricious spouses. 
In Garcia, the deceased and plaintiff were engaged to be 
married. The wedding was scheduled to occur eight days after 
his death in an air crash. They had lived together, bought a 
house together, and shared resources and expenses. Plaintiff 
sued for deceased's alleged wrongful death and the trial court 
granted summary judgment against her. Plaintiff appealed. In 
Nieto, deceased and plaintiff were engaged to be married and 
had a child. Four days before their wedding, deceased was 
wrongfully and recklessly shot and killed by a Los Angeles police 
officer. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death and the trial court sus-
tained defendant City's demurrer. Plaintiff appealed. 
Code of Civil Procedure section 377,2311 California's wrongful 
death statute, allows a cause of action by a decedent's "heirs" or 
"personal representatives" against a person or persons wrong-
fully causing such decedent's death. Section 377(b)236 defines 
heirs as 1) persons entitled to succeed to decedents' property 
under Probate Code section 200-258;a37 2) decedents' putative 
spouses and their children, decedents' stepchildren and parents, 
when they are dependents of decedent; and 3) other dependent 
minors living with decedent. Meretricious spouses are not listed 
in section 200-258 as persons entitled to succeed to decedents' 
property. 
The California Supreme Court has held that the right to 
privacy under the California Constitution includes the right to 
live with whomever one wishes. In City of Santa Barbara v. 
Adamson,1l38 the Court used strict scrutiny to strike down a zon-
ing ordinance which limited the number of unrelated adults who 
could live together. 
235. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODS § 377 (Deering 1983). 
236. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377(b) (Deering 1983). 
237. CAL. PROS. CODE §§ 200-258. (Deering 1974 & Supp. 1983). 
238. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptl. 539 (1980). 
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In Garcia, plaintiff argued that she was an "heir" for pur-
poses of section 377 and alternatively, that the court should ex-
pand section 377's definition of "heir" to include her. Although 
plaintiff in Nieto conceded she was not among section 377's 
"heirs," both plaintiffs claimed that their exclusion from section 
377's definition of "heirs" violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the California Constitution by violating a 
fundamental right. Plaintiff in Nieto articulated that fundamen-
tal right as the right to privacy, including the right to associate 
freely. She argued that the statute should be strictly scrutinized 
as required by Adamson. 
These same arguments were addressed approximately one 
year before Garcia, in Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 
Inc. 239 In a factual setting almost identical to Garcia, the Harrod 
court held that because a cause of action for wrongful death is 
entirely statutory in origin, the legislature may determine, 
within constitutional limits, who may sue under it. The test for 
constitutionality was whether limitations on who may sue were 
"rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of placing rea-
sonable limits on the right to recover for wrongful death."240 Ex-
cluding meretricious spouses was held to be "reasonably related" 
because such relationships lack permanence, present greater 
problems of proof, and involve increased danger of fraudulent 
claims. Such exclusion was also held to be reasonably related to 
the legitimate state interest of promoting marriage. 
The court in Nieto agreed that rational basis scrutiny was 
the appropriate standard. It distinguished the ordinance in 
Adamson from section 377 because such ordinance imposed a 
limitation on unrelated people's ability to live together, whereas 
section 377 conferred a right on certain classes of people. The 
court could see no connection between a person's right to sue for 
wrongful death and her/his choice of living companion. Under 
rational basis scrutiny, the court went on to hold that meretri-
cious spouses are not similarly situated to married people or 
other dependent classifications listed in section 377(b). Conclud-
ing that "the hallmark of the statute generally is not, as plaintiff 
239. 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (4th Dist. 1981). 
240. Id. at 158, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 71. Strict scrutiny of section 377 was also rejected 
in Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 123-24, 524 P.2d 801, 806, 115 Cal. Rptr. 
329, 334 (1974). 
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argues, dependency; rather, it is the enforcement of obligations," 
the court nevertheless went on to distinguish the "contractual-
obligation category" of stepchildren from meretricious spouses 
because, "[c]hildren are a particularly vulnerable class in their 
dependency. " 
The court in Garcia also rejected plaintiff's contention that 
the definition of "heir" in section 377 should be judicially ex-
panded because it is unconstitutional. Its reasoning was substan-
tially the same as that in Harrod. Quoting Harrod, it character-
ized meretricious relationships as impermanent because the 
parties had chosen not to formalize them and held that 
problems of proof and fruadulent claims were more likely in ac-
tions by meretricious spouses. Yet in both Harrod and Garcia, 
as well as in Nieto, the couples had chosen to formalize their 
relationships and had been robbed of the opportunity to carry 
out their plans. Determining future losses is no more difficult 
the day before the wedding than the day after. And it is difficult 
to see how denying the claims of people about to be married will 
encourage others to marry. There would be, however, difficult 
factual inquiries involved in determining which meretricious re-
lationships had attained the requisite permanence, whereas such 
permanence is assumed (though perhaps not justifiably so) in 
marital relationships. 
In Garcia, plaintiff also argued that according to Estate of 
Atherleyl41 she was an "heir" to her meretricious spouse's prop-
erty under the Family Law Act. The court, however, held that 
Marvin v. Marvin242 had overruled that aspect of Atherley and 
relied on the fact that the legislature had not thereafter ex-
panded either the Probate Code or section 377's definition of 
"heir" to include meretricious spouses. Both the Garcia and 
Nieto courts held that, because the legislature had undertaken 
to expand section 377's definition to include dependent stepchil-
dren248 in response to a court's denying their recovery,244 the leg-
241. 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975) (held that under the Family Law 
Act, a meretricious spouse has the same property rights to heirship as a putative spouse, 
when an actual family relationship is shown). 
242. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976). 
243. Act of Aug. 25, 1975, ch. 334, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 784 (codified at CAL. CIY. 
PROC. CODE § 377(b)(2) (Deering 1983». 
244. Steed, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329. 
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islature had intended to exclude meretricious spouses from 
recovery.2411 
Until the legislature is persuaded to expand the definition 
of "heir" for purposes of section 377 to include meretricious 
spouses, the courts will be unlikely to do so because they find a 
rational relation between the current definition and a legitimate 
state interest. And until such definition is expanded to include 
them, meretricious spouses will continue to be denied a wrongful 
death cause of action, regardless of the status of their non-mari-
tal relationship. 
2. Meretricious spouse with "stable and significant" rela-
tionship may sue for loss of consortium 
Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal . 
. Rptr. 503 (4th Dist. 1983). In Butcher v. Superior Court, a Cali-
fornia court of appeal held for the first time that a meretricious 
spouse who could prove a "stable and significant" relationship 
with her injured spouse could claim loss of consortium resulting 
from her spouse's injury. It reasoned that such an unmarried 
person's interest in the continuation of the relationship is no 
longer outweighed by policy considerations which favor limiting 
the consortium action to married people. The court distin-
guished the marriage requirement in a consortium action from 
that in an action for statutory wrongful death246 because of the 
common law nature of the loss of consortium cause of action. 
Plaintiffs, a meretricious couple, had lived together for more 
than eleven years, had two children, filed joint tax returns, used 
the same name and considered themselves married. When plain-
tiff husband was allegedly struck by defendant's car, he sued for 
personal injuries and his meretricious wife sued for loss of con-
sortium. Defendant moved for summary judgment against wife 
based on the lack of a legally valid marriage and the trial court 
denied his motion. Defendant appealed. 
The loss of consortium cause of action originated as a hus-
245. It should be noted, however, that the analogy is somewhat faulty because 
neither Atherley nor Marvin were section 377 cases, and because until 1981, the court 
had not yet ruled on the wrongful death claim of a meretricious spouse. 
246. See supra, Survey note on Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 
184 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1982), at 791. 
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band's claim for loss of his proprietary interest in his wife's ser-
vices.247 The modern theory recognizes loss of consortium as a 
cause of action for loss of a relational interest,248 and in Califor-
nia it has been extended to wives as well as to husbands.24e In all 
but one case,2110 however, courts have assumed that the claim is 
available only to people who are legally married at the time of 
the injury.2II1 For instance in Donough v. Vile,2II2 the court held 
that a husband could not recover for loss of consortium resulting 
from injuries to his wife occurring before their marriage. 
So far, California's loss of consortium cause of action has 
similarily been limited to legally married people. In Borer v. 
American Airlines2lls the California Supreme Court denied the 
child of an injured parent a loss of consortium claim. Emphasiz-
ing the differences between parental and sexual consortium, the 
court expressed concern that allowing a child's action might 
"open the floodgates" to all members of the family.2114 The court 
held that the loss of consortium action must be narrowly circum-
scribed for policy reasons. In Tong v. Jocson,21111 a couple who 
were engaged and had lived together for three months when the 
injury occurred were denied a cause of action for loss of consor-
tium in a very short opinion which relied heavily on Borer. And 
in Etienne v. DKM Enterprises, Inc. 2l1s a meretricious couple 
who had lived together for eight years sued for injuries and loss 
of consortium based on an alleged Texas common law marriage. 
The court denied their claim based on the invalidity of the mar-
riage under Texas law. m 
247. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 873, § 124 (4th ed. 1971). 
248. Id. 
249. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. 
Rptr. 765 (1974). Other jurisdictions have also extended the cause of action to wives. See 
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 
Mich. 33, 101 N.W. 2d 227 (1960). 
250. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980). 
25l. Id. at 1079. 
252. 61 Pa.D C 460 (1947). 
253. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977). 
254. The court also pointed out that a spousal cause of action involves only one 
additional claim, whereas allowing a cause of action to children could greatly increase the 
number of potential claims flowing from a single negligent act. 
255. 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977). 
256. 136 Cal. App. 3d 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982). 
257. Since both parties assumed that legal marriage was an element of the 1088 of 
consortium cause, the court ruled only on the validity of the "common law" marriage. 
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The Butcher court nevertheless held that a legal marriage 
was not a prerequisite to plaintiff wife's claim for loss of consor-
tium. The court reasoned that Donough and similar cases merely 
recognized that a loss of consortium action sought to protect a 
relational interest, and that injuries occurring before such an in-
terest existed were not compensable. Recognizing that unmar-
ried people also have an interest in the continuation of certain 
relationships, the court analyzed several policy considerations 
which might, nevertheless, justify limiting the action to those 
who are legally married. These considerations included: 1) lack 
of precedent; 2) the indirect nature of the injury; 3) the specula-
tive nature of damages; 4) a danger of opening the "floodgates" 
to other plaintiffs; and 5) the public policy favoring marriage. 
The court ultimately found that none of these considerations 
justified the limitation. 
On California precedent, the court first emphasized the "in-
herent capacity of the common law for growth and change"2118 
and the responsibility of the courts for its upkeep.2119 It then at-
tacked the precedential value of each of the above cases. Be-
cause Borer was based upon the difference between parental and 
sexual consortium, the court held that it was not applicable to 
plaintiffs relationship which more resembled a marital than a 
parent-child relationship. The Tong relationship, the court held 
was not well enough established at the time of the accident to 
support a loss of consortium claim. Additionally, the Tong 
court's reliance on Borer was misplaced according to Butcher 
because of the difference in the types of relationships involved. 
And because the parties in Etienne agreed that marriage was a 
prerequisite, and the court focused only on the question whether 
a valid marriage existed, the Butcher court refused to recognize 
it as precedent in this case. 
Instead, the court relied upon a case in which New Jersey 
law was applied, to allow a loss of consortium cause of action to 
a meretricious spouse. That case, Bullock v. United States,260 is 
the only case in which the marriage issue has been directly ad-
dressed, since in all other cases it was assumed that marriage 
258. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 384, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767 quoting 15 
AM. JUR. 2n, Common Law §§ 1-2, at 794-96 (2d ed. 1957). 
259. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 393, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776. 
260. 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980). 
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was a prerequisite. The Bullock court cited a host of recent au-
thority from all over the country, questioning common law views 
of unmarried couples in other contexts, and pointed out the sim-
ilarities between meretricious and marital relationships. The 
Butcher court accepted its analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, the court also rejected policy consid-
erations which might nevertheless justify limiting loss of consor-
tium to married people. Most of them had already been rejected 
for the purpose of extending the action to wives, and the court 
held that the same analyses applied here. As to the indirect na-
ture of the injury, the court held that the ultimate issue is fore-
seeability of the injury to the meretricious spouse. In this con-
temporary society, it held, the existence of a meretricious 
relationship and injury to that relationship is entirely foresee-
able. Therefore damages are not indirect. It also reasoned that 
the damages were no more speculative than any other emotional 
or mental damages, including those in a wife's loss of consortium 
action. Again emphasizing the difference in kind between estab-
lished sexual relationships and other familial relationships, the 
court held that the "floodgates" potential was not sufficient to 
justify disallowing the action. Finally, the court rejected the ar-
gument that wrongful death and Workers Compensation stat-
utes indicated a public policy in favor of marriage. The statutory 
nature of these causes of action, it reasoned, entirely distin-
guished them from a common law loss of consortium action. 
By way of limitation, the court held that only where plain-
tiffs could prove a stable and significant relationship would the 
cause of action be available. Factors involved in proving such a 
relationship might include: 1) the duration of the relationships; 
2) a mutual contract; 3) the extent of economic cooperation and 
entanglement; 4) the exclusivity of the sexual relationship; and, 
5) the existence of a "family" relationship with children. The 
court affirmed the denial of defendant's summary judgment and 
remanded to allow plaintiffs to prove such a relationship. 
The court in Butcher broke new ground by allowing a mere-
tricious spouse to bring a loss of consortium action. In so doing, 
it recognized an important interest in the continuation of "sta-
ble and significant" non-marital relationships. Although the 
court discredited California's rather weak precedent disallowing 
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such actions, certainly no precedent compels its conclusion, and 
its fate, should it be appealed, is uncertain. 
C. WRONGFUL LIFE ACTIONS 
1. Child born impaired may not bring action for wrongful 
life general damages 
Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 337 (1982). In Turpin v. Sortini, the California Supreme 
Court resolved the question of whether or not a child has a cause 
of action for wrongful life. It held that a child plaintiff may not 
bring a wrongful life action to recover general damages for being 
born impaired, rather than not being born at all, but may re-
cover special damages for extraordinary expenses. 
Plaintiff parents were advised by a speech and hearing spe-
cialist that their daughter had normal hearing when, in fact, she 
was completely deaf due to a hereditary ailment. Relying on this 
diagnosis, parents conceived their second child who was also 
born completely deaf. Alleging that the second child would not 
have been conceived had they known of the genetic deafness, 
parents brought a negligence suit on behalf of their second child. 
They sought both damages for the child's being deprived of the 
fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human be-
ing without total deafness, and special damages for extraordi-
nary expenses for specialized teaching, training, and hearing 
equipment. The trial court dismissed the entire cause of action 
on demurrer and the court of appeal affirmed. Plaintiffs 
appealed. 
The question of whether or not a child can bring a wrongful 
life action was addressed and decided differently in two Califor-
nia courts of appeal. In Cur lender v. Bio-Science Laborato-
ries,261 the court held that an infant born with Tay-Sachs dis-
ease stated a cause of action for wrongful life against the 
defendant laboratories which had negligently misinformed the 
child's parents that they would not produce a child afflicted with 
the disease. The court of appeal in Turpin, however, had denied 
plaintiff a cause of action for either general or special damages. 
Previously, although courts of appeal had upheld parents' rights 
261. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). 
69
King: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
800 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:731 
to sue for the birth of unexpected and unwanted children due to 
another's negligence,262 they had denied a healthy unwanted 
child's right to sue for being born as opposed to. not being 
born.26s 
Courts outside of California had generally allowed some re-
covery to the parents of hereditarily afflicted children who were 
born because of the negligence of medical professionals.264 How-
ever, they had uniformly rejected general damages claims by 
such children themselves.26& 
Although the supreme court in Turpin reversed, and upheld 
the parents' right to recover their extraordinary expenses, it held 
that a child cannot maintain a wrongful life action to recover 
general damages for being born impaired rather than not being 
born at all. The court framed the child's position as one of being 
forced into the worse of two alternatives: existence in an im-
paired state as opposed to non-existence. It refused to grant re-
covery on this theory for two reasons. First, the court held that 
it is impossible to determine rationally whether plaintiff had in 
fact suffered more injury by being born than she would have by 
not being born. Second, it held that it is impossible to assess 
general damages in a fair, non speCUlative manner. 
The court found that what the child lost is not life without 
pain, but rather the unknowable status of never having been 
born. Therefore, a jury would have to compare impaired life to 
non-life in assessing damages, and such a comparison would be 
impossible. Because of this immeasurable variable, the court 
concluded that the jury could not rationally determine a specific 
monetary award for general damages. 
In denying recovery of general damages, the court also re-
262. Custodio v. Bower, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Stills v. 
Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). 
263. Stills, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652. 
264. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Schroeder v. 
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E. 2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Ja-
cobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). 
265. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1979), aff'd in part and reu'd in 
part, 439 A.2d 110, 112 (Pa. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 11-13 (N.J. 1979); Beck-
er, 386 N.E. 2d at 811-12; Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Dumer v. St. 
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 374-76 (Wis. 1975). 
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lied on the benefit doctrine in tort damages.266 The two elements 
involved here, according to the court, were the injury to the 
child's general physical, emotional, and psychological state, and 
the incidental benefit of the child's mere existence and capacity 
to experience the joys of life. The court concluded that applica-
tion of this doctrine is impossible because of the incalculable na-
ture of the benefits and harms involved. 
The Court further conCluded that a monetary award could 
not meaningfully compensate the child for the loss of the oppor-
tunity not to be born.267 Again, the rationale was that the mone-
tary values of life and nonexistence could not be accurately 
calculated. 
A dissent of two justices argued that the court should ad-
here to the principles that for every wrong there is a remedy and 
that an injured party should be compensated for all damages 
proximately caused by the negligent party. Quoting Curlender, 
it concluded that reasonable compensation can be calculated by 
the " 'impartial conscience and judgment of jurors who may be 
expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with 
the evidence.' "26i! 
In Turpin the Supreme Court allowed a wrong to go un-
remedied by denying a wrongful life action to a child born im-
paired due to a doctor's negligence. That a wrong exists here is 
clear. The child's existence and suffering are genuinely detri-
mental and she should be able to recover damages for the pain 
and suffering endured during her lifetime. A valuation of life it-
self is not necessary to compensate the child for the pain and 
suffering inherent in having to proce,ed in life with genetic de-
266. Damages caused by defendant's negligence must be offset by benefits inciden-
tially conferred on plaintiff. 
267. Several cases have denied recovery because monetary damages could not mean-
ingfully compensate the injured party. Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 
P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 
871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (meaningful monetary compensation impossible in cases of 
loss of parental consortium). . 
268. Curlender, lOS Cal. App. 3d 811, 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 490, quoting 
Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 893, 500 P.2d 880, 883, 103 Cal. 
Rptr. 856, 859 (1972). 
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fects made manifest by medical malpractice. 
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